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As of the early 1970s, there has been an increased attention to the study of 
networks in the various branches of the social sciences (Powell & Smith Doerr, 1994). 
The significant emphasis on network research can be explained by the general shift in the 
social sciences from individualistic and atomistic explanations towards more relational 
and institutional understandings (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Research on networks enables 
researchers to model the social relationships among interacting social actors and learn the 
implications of these relationships (Anderson, Wasserman & Crouch, 1999). This field of 
enquiry has been increasingly growing in popularity over the years, allowing some to 
characterize it as a hot “fashion” (Jarillo, 1988).   
A network is “a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or 
lack of relationship, between the nodes” (Brass et al., 2004: 795).  In inter organizational 
networks, these nodes are organizations. Networks represent regular patterns of 
interaction between actors commonly referred to as 'structures' (Anderson et al., 1999).  
Network structures can affect many aspects of firms such as their performance (McEvily 
& Zaheer, 1999; Nohria & Gracia pont 1991; Rowley et al., 2000; Shipilove, 2006: Uzzi, 
1996), innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Capaldo, 2007; Gibbons 2004; Shan, Walker & Kogut, 
1994; Schilling & Phelps, 2007), and even the survival of startups (Baum et al, 2000; 
Powell et al 1996). Burt (1992) emphasizes that well structured networks can lead to 
more social capital. Firms with superior network structures are better positioned to 
exploit their internal capabilities (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Moreover, the structural 
characteristics of a network can affect the profitability of firms within that network 
(Gulati et al., 2000). In brief, the inter firm network structure is an important factor that 
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affects the economic activities and performance of network members (Rowley et al., 
2000).  
Given the importance of network structures for the strategic objectives of firms, 
we have to recognize the factors that create these structures. This research presents the 
inter organizational network structure as a dependent variable, an approach which has not 
been explored extensively in the literature. There are some attempts to explain network 
evolution such as Amburgey et al. (2008), Doreian (2008), and Hite (2008). All of these 
studies concentrate on the internal mechanisms within networks that lead networks to 
evolve in certain directions. These studies, however, overlook the effect of external 
factors on network structure specifically in cross country contexts. Therefore, in this 
research we emphasize that if we want to fully understand the consequences of network 
structures, we need to recognize the factors that have created these structures in the first 
place. Zaheer and Soda (2009) claim that without understanding the causal linkages that 
create a structure, knowledge of network outcomes remains incomplete. 
 This study aspires to answer the following research questions: What are the 
factors that shape inter organizational network structures? Does the structure of inter 
organizational networks differ between countries? If so why?  To answer these questions, 
this research will conduct a systematic analysis of the structural difference of inter 
organizational networks across different countries. By doing so, the hope is to assess 
whether organizations from different countries have different tendencies towards 
cooperation and different structural configurations to build their networks.  More specific 
questions include: are the organizational networks denser in Japan or China, Canada or 
France?  Acknowledging these differences is not the only contribution of this research, as 
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Ialso hope to examine and explain the sources of these differences. The comparison will 
be performed for 18 different countries in terms of their economies (emerging/developed) 
or geographic locations (east/west or northern/southern hemisphere). 
I argue that the structure of inter organizational networks is a function of two 
interrelated factors: the availability of strategic resources and the institutional profile of 
the domain of inter organizational networks. More specifically, the availability of 
resources partially mediates the relationship between the institutional profile and the 
network structure. For instance, it is hypothesized that countries that have weak legal 
institutional environments will have fewer resources in open markets, requiring firms to 
develop more alliances to have access to needed resources.  As a result, in such countries 
there will be denser networks with more ties among their members.   
Considering institutional factors as the main determinants in alliance formation 
(the building blocks of networks) is not something new in the literature; Oliver (1991) 
presented two institutional forces that affect the formation of alliances among firms, 
namely necessity and legitimacy. However, very few studies have tried to empirically test 
the real effect of the institutional environment on alliance formation and more 
specifically the network structure of alliances. A key contribution of this research is, thus, 
to identify the magnitude of the influence that the institutional environment has on the 
network structure. Adding the institutional profile to the model will allow us to explain 
the apparent differences in network structures around the world.  
The Industrial Organization perspective emphasizes the effects of industries on 
the performance of firms and asks the famous question: does the industry matter (Rumelt, 
1991; McGahan & Porter, 1997)?  The introduction of the institutional based view (Peng 
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et al., 2008) has raised another important question: does the country matter? Makino et al. 
(2004) show that national contextual factors influence firms’ behaviors and economic 
performance. We can ask the same two questions regarding the structure of inter 
organizational networks. Rosenkopf and Schilling, (2007) have answered the former 
question by comparing the network structures of (32) industries, concluding that industry 
does matter. I will try to answer the latter question and show that the country also matters 
to the network structures.  
This study compares the network structures of the following 18 countries that 
have apparent differences in their institutional profiles:  Australia, Belgium, Denmark, 
Canada, China, India, Italy, Germany, France, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Singapore, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Networks in the biomedical 
industry are used in this study for two main reasons.  First, this is a kind of industry that 
requires an extensive number of alliance formations; which means more available data 
for the purpose of this study.  As Powell et al. (1996) argue, the R&D intensity and the 
level of technological sophistication are positively related to the number of alliances in 
this industry. Second, there is a wider coverage of cooperative activities in this industry.  
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) techniques have been used to test the hypotheses.  
This study contributes to two different theoretical streams in the strategic 
management literature. The first theoretical stream concerns the emerging debate over the 
grounding of strategy in economics as opposed to institutional conceptualizations. This 
research combines the two paradigms by incorporating institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory to explain the factors that affect inter organizational network 
structures.   
5
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The second theoretical stream that will be covered relates to the contingency 
approach literature (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Burt, 2000; Rowley et al., 2000), which 
explains the preference of closure (Coleman, 1988) vs. holes (Burt, 1992) regarding 
network structure. This research contributes to the discussion in particular by focusing on 
the contingency of countries. It will be argued that many of the institutional forces that 
vary among countries determine the prevalence of one structure over another. This 
research also contributes to the international business literature by exploring the 
significant role that institutional differences play in explaining countries’ differences in 




















Network studies span many disciplines such as management studies, health care 
service, public administration, sociology, psychology, and communications (Provan et 
al., 2007). Powell and Smith Doerr (1994) argue that there are two approaches to study 
networks in social science. The first approach is based on sociology and organizational 
theory, and it portrays networks as analytical devices to explain intra  and inter 
organizational ties and their relationship with the environment. The second approach, 
which is multidisciplinary, presents the network as a “kind of organizing logic” that 
functions to arrange economic relationships.  
In sociology, networks have been used to explain interpersonal relationships (e.g. 
Granovetter, 1973) or interfirm relations (e.g. Van de Ven, 1976). Sociologists use 
networks to explain the role of relationships in creating meaning and order to social life 
and to explain how networks emphasize structure and constraints (Powell & Smith Doerr, 
1994). A major shift in introducing networks to sociology was achieved when 
Granovetter (1985) reemphasized and developed Polyani’s (1944) notion of 
embeddedness. Granovetter (1985) explains how the network of social relations affects 
economic life. The use of networks has become prevalent in sociology allowing Parkhe et 
al. (2006) to comment that sociologists (compared to other disciplines) have dominated 
network research since 1970s.  
In the Organizational Theory domain, network analyses have been traditionally 
used to explain how resources flow among actors or how the position in a network affects 
the status of individuals (Salancik, 1995). Nohria (1994) points out that organizations are 




Early mentioning of networks can be traced back to Roethlisberger and Dickson 
(1939) in the management literature. They draw attention to the role of informal 
relationships (i.e. networks) within organizations. Simon (1945) also noticed the 
existence of formal and informal communication channels and is one of the pioneers in 
describing the role of informal social networks inside organizations. This suggests that 
the earlier studies of network concepts are concentrated on the networks of individuals 
within organizations.  
In strategic management, however, interest in networks did not take place until 
the end of the 1980s. Researchers did not consider networks in their investigations 
because they failed to recognize the effect of firms’ alliances on performance (Gulati et 
al., 2000). Jarillo (1988) also explains this late adaptation of network analysis by arguing 
that strategists do not use the network construct because it is very hard to match with the 
basic assumption of competitive behavior that values competition over cooperation. The 
new emphasis on network analysis has been a great contribution to the field, enhancing 
many traditional research streams in strategy such as industry structure, positioning, 
dynamic and path dependent constraints and benefits, and the resource based view 
(Gulati et al., 2000). 
Over the last two decades, there has been a surge in the focus on networks in 
managerial studies. There are many indications that signal the importance of this trend. 
For instance, in the last 15 years, there have been at least four special issues in leading 
management journals that dealt specifically with the topic of networks [Strategic 
Management Journal 2000 (Vol. 21, N. 3); Academy of Management Journal 1997 (Vol. 
8

40, N. 2) and 2004 (Vol. 47, N. 6); and Academy of Management Review 2006 (Vol.31, 
N. 3)]. We also had a special issue dealing with the Asia Pacific networks in the Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management 2005 (Vol. 22).  In addition to these special issues, there 
is a substantial number of articles that are distributed throughout regular issues and many 
books that are devoted totally to the topic of networks (e.g. Alter & Hage 1993; Baum & 
Rowley, 2008; Nohria & Eccles 1992; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997).    
 One of the major concerns of management studies is to explore the interactions 
between individuals, groups, and/or organizations; network research can help to 
illuminate the relational aspects of these interactions (Brass et al., 2004). In fact, the 
primacy of relations is the most frequently proposed difference between network research 
and conventional social science research (Kilduff et al., 2006).  
This review of the literature covers three major themes. First, it discusses the use 
of network analysis in management science across three levels of analysis: individual, 
group and organizational, with more emphasis being placed on the organizational level. 
Second, it provides a comprehensive review for the construct of 'network structure'.  
Finally, it reviews the research concerned with detecting country effect on the networking 
activities of firms. 
 
			 !	
The focus on networks in management research has grown exponentially in recent 
years (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). A significant contribution of using networks in 
management studies is that networks theory emphasizes the attributes of different actors 
and the relationship among them rather than concentrating exclusively on the attributes of 
individual actors (Parkhe et al., 2006).  According to transaction cost economics, the 
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network mode of organization, the 'hybrid' mode, displays an intermediate value between 
two extreme modes, namely the 'market' and 'hierarchy' modes of organization 
(Williamson, 1991). Moreover, Powell and Smith Doerr state that “the strength of 
networks – the flexibility with which they permit recombining various components to 
exploit new opportunities – may, under certain conditions, outpace the capabilities of 
hierarchy” (1994: 381). 
Networks are essential components of markets since they organize and direct the 
flow of tangible and intangible resources from position to position within a social 
structure (Owen Smith & Powell, 2004). The network mode of organization, when 
compared to the market or hierarchy modes, can be considered as a more flexible way of 
production because networks have the ability to add new links and dissolve dysfunctional 
ones (Contractor et al., 2006).  Networks are not only considered as flexible systems, but 
they also provide flexibility for their members because they allow firms “to enjoy the 
added flexibility of not having fixed commitments to activities which are not essential to 
them” (Jarillo, 1988: 35). 
Many reviews have been presented to synthesize the network research in 
management science. As an introduction to a special issue on alliances and networks, 
Gulati et al. (2000) review the research of networks in strategy. Barringer and Harrison 
(2000) provide an overview of the literature on inter organizational relationships.  
Borgatti and Foster (2003) take a more comprehensive stance and review the “network 
paradigm” in organizational research as a whole. Brass et al. (2004) provide a very 
interesting review of network research in management science at individual, group, and 
organizational levels. Contractor et al. (2006) present a comprehensive overview for 
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networks theories that have been used in managerial science. Finally, Provan et al. (2007) 
review the empirical literature on inter organizational networks at the network level of 
analysis.    
 
	"#"$%	%#%		
Paying attention to the interpersonal and informal networks inside organizations 
has been a long tradition in organization theory. That happened even though the rationale 
of personal networks goes against the famous argument of Weber (1947) that impersonal 
and official relations are the basis for the bureaucratic system and a factor of its success. 
Barnard (1938) claims that informal organizations (i.e. networks) are found within all 
formal organizations; the former is to provide vitality and the latter to secure order. Udy 
(1959) supports this argument by emphasizing the existence of “informal organization.” 
Simon (1945) also notes the existence of formal and informal communication channels 
within organizations.   
Homans (1950) adds “sentiment” as a main factor that affects the behavior of 
persons in groups and also explains how sentiments can assist in establishing informal 
relations. Criticizing the bureaucratic system and advocating for the role of informal 
relationships, Crozier (1964) suggests that centralization and impersonal rules permit an 
escape from reality, what has been termed as “bureaucratic tendencies”.  He also argues 
that the bureaucratic system “is too rigid to adjust without crises to the transformations 
that the accelerated evolution of industrial society makes more and more imperative” 
(1964: 198).  
All the previous arguments have a common theme: informal relationships can 
complement and give more flexibility to the formal bureaucratic relationships within 
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organizations and networks. In addition to flexibility, networks can help in the organizing 
effort within organizations (DiMaggio, 1992). Studying organizations form a network 
perspective has great relevance, as Nohria states it: “all organizations are in important 
respects social networks and need to be addressed and analyzed as such” (1992: 4). 
Individual level networks can be intra  and inter organizational. In the former 
case, the networks are formed between individual employees within their organizations.  
Inter organizational individual networks refer to the personal connections between 
members of a firm with their peers in other organizations or with government officials.  
In this section, I will concentrate on intra organizational networks.  
Intra organizational networks are the informal relationships between employees. 
Examples of these relationships are friendship, help, and advice. Nohria (1992) argues 
that identifying the position of actors in networks of relationships is a major step in 
understanding the attitude and behavior of these actors in organizations. 
Many factors are suggested to have an influence on the formation of intra 
organizational networks.  These include similarities between actors and their personality, 
the organization's structure, and other environmental factors such as environmental jolts, 
and societal culture (Brass et al., 2004).  In building their advice networks, advice seekers 
employ a variety of human choice and decision making perspectives, and they decide 
whom to contact by trading off expected knowledge value versus the cost of obtaining it 
(Nebus, 2006). 
The existence of the informal networks inside organizations has significant 
consequences for both individuals and the organization as a whole. The rationale behind 
network consequences can be clarified by the social capital argument.  Burt (2000) argues 
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that the traditional explanations for any variation on performance are based on human 
capital arguments. He explains that the human capital explanation of inequality between 
individuals suggests that people who do better are more able as individuals (more 
intelligent, attractive, articulate, and skilled). On the other hand, the social capital 
explanation for inequality emphasizes that individuals who do better are somehow better 
connected. In brief, people who have favorable connections will enjoy better performance 
and results.  
Individual networks, especially weak ties, are a very strong source of employment 
opportunities (Granovetter, 1973). Not only do networks affect the probability of getting 
a job, but they also affect advancements and promotions (Burt, 1992). It has been argued 
that network position has a real influence on work performance (Mehra et al., 2001).  
Networks play a significant role in the distribution of power and influence within 
organizations (Nohria, 1992).  In addition to promotion and performance, networks shape 
many other aspects of the work environment such as attitudes, job satisfaction, turnover, 
leadership and ethical behavior (Brass et al., 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that 
organizational citizenship behavior and performance are highly affected by social 
network ties within organizations (Bowler & Brass, 2006). 
Nohria (1992) points out that in addition to the positive roles that networks play in 
organizational life, they may also have restraining effects. Labianca and Brass draw 
attention to the negative relationships inside organizations, and they define them as 
“ongoing and recurring relationships within the context of a work organization in which 
at least one person dislikes another” (2006: 596). They also assert that the liabilities of 
networks are often ignored in the literature, even though they might have greater 
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explanatory power than positive relationships.   
 
&	'$(	%#%		
Within organizations, groups or units can be conceptualized as 'nodes', and the 
relationship between them can represent networks (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). Based on 
this perspective, group interaction can be understood using network analysis (Tsai, 2000). 
Moreover, network analysis can be used to understand intragroup dynamics (e.g. Mehra 
et al., 2006; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). Group networks have a significant influence 
on the functioning of these groups (Joshi, 2006) and on the functioning of the 
organization as a whole. Intergroup networks can also be formed vertically or 
horizontally within the organization; the former improve the team’s position in the 
organization, and the latter help to coordinate work and have access to information 
(Joshi, 2006). 
As discussed above, individual networks consist of informal relationships. Group 
networks, however, can be either formal or informal (Brass et al., 2004). Therefore, we 
can argue that the factors that create group networks differ from those that create 
individual networks. Organizational processes such as the design of operations and 
control mechanisms, like centralization for example, impose formal constrains on the 
creation of group networks (Brass et al., 2004; Joshi, 2006). The size, performance 
record, and resource endowment of a group can affect the ties it creates with other groups 
in an organization (Brass et al., 2004). The creation of intergroup networks will be 
affected by interpersonal interactions between the members of a group and their contacts 
outside the group. Thus, the interpersonal ties and the personalities of the group members 
will affect the creation of intergroup networks (Brass et al., 2004). 
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 Group networks have many implications for group performance (Brass et al., 
2004). For instance, Mehra et al. (2006) find that the configuration of the external and 
internal social networks of a group’s leader is related to the objective performance of the 
group. Reagans et al. (2004) support this argument by confirming that inter and intra 
group networks have a significant effect on the speed at which projects are completed. 
Zaheer and Soda (2009) concentrate on the external relationships of teams, and they 
argue that the design of this network affect the performance of teams. Oh et al. (2006) 
argue that groups that have more social capital tend to have greater effectiveness.  Two 
major objectives for the establishment of intergroup networks are the exchange of 
resources and the transfer of knowledge (Tsai, 2000). Brass et al. (2004) indicate that 
intergroup networks have a considerable influence on the innovation and knowledge 
creation of groups.   
 
&	) *%		
“Interfirm networks are collections of firms joined by ties that vary in formality, 
but are stable and significant enough to create reasonably persistent interfirm structure” 
(Rowley et al., 2004: 453). Organizational networks encompass a wide range of forms 
that starts with informal relations between individuals (Uzzi, 1996) or interlocking 
directorships among firms (Davis et al., 2003) and end with formal contractual 
agreements in terms of joint ventures and strategic alliances that are defined as 
“voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co development 
of products, technologies, or services.” (Gulati, 1998: 293).  
A major difference between inter organizational networks and individual and 
team networks is that inter organizational networks are harder to detect. Identifying the 
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network can be a hard job even for a firm that is a member of that network. Accordingly, 
“to detect overarching structure, one has to rise above the individual firm and analyze the 
system as a whole” (Bowler et al., 1992: 312). The proliferation of inter organizational 
network research has been fueled by the increasing adaptation of the strategic network 
approach. This approach maintains that the value creating activities rest at the network 
level rather than firm level; therefore, we need to extend the limits of strategic enquiry to 
include the networks in which firms are embedded (Dagnino, Levanti & Li Destri, 2008).    
Below, I discuss two main streams of research that occupy the study of networks 
at the organizational level   namely network formation and network consequences. I 
follow this with a detailed exploration of the third stream of network structure.  
 
&	) *%		+!			
In the literature, the emphasize has been placed on alliance formations rather than 
network formations, but since alliances are the building blocks of networks, the 
arguments for alliances formation can be extended to discuss network formation. There 
are many classifications for network formations throughout the literature. For instance, 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) divide the factors that affect network formation, by 
establishing alliances, into 'strategic' and 'social' explanations. Strategic explanations 
highlight the need for strategic alliances, while social explanations suggest the 
opportunity to form new alliances. I will present the four most common factors provided 
in the literature for explaining network formation. They are: a firm’s resource 
procurement and the level of uncertainty, social capital, the institutional environment, and 




1.2.1.1. Resource procurement and uncertainty  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that the survival of an organization is 
contingent upon its ability to effectively manage the internal demands of the groups upon 
which it is dependent and its ability to acquire and maintain resources from the external 
environment. They maintain that since the environment is uncertain, organizations can 
arrange contracts with other firms to guarantee the required resources; in other words, 
they can establish interfirm networks.   
Building on resource dependence theory, managing interdependence has been the 
most common explanation for the emergence of interfirm networks (Baum et al., 2003).  
External interdependence focuses on two considerations: resource procurement and 
uncertainty reduction (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Resource procurement is a major factor that encourages firms to establish 
networks. Oliver (1990) argues that a firm enters into an alliance to exercise power and 
control over another organization’s resources. Firms usually seek three types of resources 
from their network partners. First, firms establish networks to have access to capital (Lee 
et al., 2001; Uzzi, 1999). Second, firms participate in networks to have access to partners’ 
tacit knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Kale et al., 2000; Oxley & Sampson, 2004) and to learn 
from their partners (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Kogut, 1988; Powell et 
al., 1996). Finally, firms join networks to have access to technological resources (Baum 
et al., 2003).  
Reducing uncertainty is the second factor that affects network structure according 
to resource dependence theory. In situations of high level of uncertainty, organizations 
seek stability by establishing alliances to avoid facing an unstable environment (Oliver, 
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1990). This idea of coping with environmental uncertainty is derived from Thompson 
(1967) and is supported by Baum and Oliver (1991) who argue that organizations with 
institutional linkages exhibit a significant survival advantage. 
 
1.2.1.2. Institutional factors 
The recognition of institutional factors as key determinants in the formation of 
alliances networks was first introduced theoretically by Oliver (1990), and this has been 
developed further by other scholars (e.g. Dacin et al., 2007; Peng & Zhou, 2005).  
However, very few studies have shown this relationship empirically. Oliver (1990) 
suggests two institutional determinants of alliance formation: necessity and legitimacy. 
The former explains that a firm establishes a linkage with other organizations to meet 
legal or regulatory requirements. The latter emphasizes that a firm participates in 
alliances to gain legitimacy by improving its reputation, image, or exhibiting congruence 
with prevailing norms in its institutional environment.  
 
1.2.1.3. Social capital  
A firm that has good social capital is more able to choose its alliances and, 
eventually, its optimal network structure. As Gulati notes, “firms with more social capital 
will not only have access to information about a larger number of alliances, but they may 
also be able to attract better partners who want to ally with them” (1998: 298). Social 
capital is defined as “the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its source lies in the 
structure and content of the actor’s social relations.  Its effects flow from the information, 
influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” (Adler & Kown, 2002: 23). 
Thus, social capital is the accumulated experience of a firm with other current or 
18 
 
potential partners that is developed as a result of the previous ties among these firms 
(Gulati, 1995). The social networks in which most firms are embedded become important 
sources of information about the reliability and capabilities of their partners (Gulati, 
1995).  
 Not only does social capital arise from the previous relationships between 
organizations, but it can also be generated by the personal social capital of the 
management team. For instance, Larson (1992) points out that prior personal 
relationships and known reputations reduce uncertainty and establish expectations that 
enhance early cooperation between organizations. After many interviews with several 
entrepreneurs, she argues that personal relations have a great role in strategic alliances. 
This is not to say that economic incentives were absent but that a social context provides 
the environment within which economic exchange can be established. She concludes that 
concrete personal relations provide a base frame for economic exchange in strategic 
alliances.   
 On the same line, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) argue that extensive 
personal relationships and the social capital of the top management team create an 
awareness of opportunities for networking as well as knowledge and trust among 
potential partners. More specifically, they find that firms with large, experienced, and 
well connected top management teams will have greater rates of strategic alliances. The 
experience is measured by the number of previous employers of the team or by the 
number of previous management positions held by members of the team.  
Gulati and Westphal (1999) examine the influence of the social network of board 
interlocks on the formation of strategic alliances. Since the board members of a firm have 
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advisory and controlling roles for the decision making of the firm, their influence on the 
formation of strategic alliances will vary as a result of the differences between these two 
roles. Consequently, a CEO board relationship that is characterized by independent board 
control reduces the likelihood of alliance formation by encouraging distrust between the 
board and the CEO. By contrast, CEO board cooperation in strategic decision making 
promotes alliance formation by enhancing trust between the CEO and the board.   
Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George (2001) examine the effects of mid level 
management connections among firms on the subsequent alliance formation among these 
firms.  They found that interfirm relations are enhanced by the interpersonal bonds that 
are built among managers in technical committees. They also find that the activities of 
technical committees facilitate the entry of less established firms into alliance networks 
by increasing the social capital of these firms. Finally, investigating U.S. investment 
banking firms’ syndication in underwriting corporate stock offerings, Chung et al. (2000) 
finds that the likelihood that an investment bank will engage in alliance formation is 
positively related to the bank’s social capital, which arises from direct and indirect 
collaborative experiences. 
 
1.2.1.4. Embeddedness  
Granovetter’s (1985) seminal work on economic action and social structure is 
considered to be the primary catalyst behind the modern research on embeddedness. He 
argues that economic actions are directly affected by the ongoing patterns of social 
relations. Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) provide more specific arguments and propose that 
economic activities are contingent on four types of embeddedness, namely cognitive, 
cultural, structural, and political. Cognitive embeddedness refers to the limitations that 
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are exerted on economic rationalities by the “structured regularities of mental processes.”  
Cultural embeddedness is concerned with how “shared collective understandings” affect 
economic activities. Patterns of ongoing interpersonal relationships create the context for 
economic exchange, which they call structural embeddedness. Political embeddedness 
explains how the struggle for power and the role of non market institutions such as state 
and social classes shape economic institutions.  
In the context of inter organizational networks, however, the major contribution 
of embeddedness is that the current pattern of relationship will affect the future 
partnerships between firms (Gulati & Gagiulo, 1999). Firms use cues from previous 
alliances to establish new ones (Gulati, 1995). Gulati and Gagiulo (1999) identify three 
types of embeddedness: i) relational embeddedness that emphasizes the role of cohesive 
ties between firms on the subsequent relationships between them; ii) structural 
embeddedness that captures the influence of the structure of the relationships around the 
firms on their cooperative activities; and iii) positional embeddedness that explains how 
the current position of a firm in its network affects its future tendencies toward 
cooperation. 
 Hagedoorn (2006) argues that inter organizational embeddedness can be 
recognized on three levels of analysis. The first is dyadic embeddedness, which 
concentrates on repeated ties within pairs of companies. The second level is inter 
organizational embeddedness, which emphasizes the history of a firm’s different 
networks. These two levels are close to those of Gulati and Gagiulo (1999).  However, 
the last level of environmental embeddedness provides a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon of embeddedness. Environmental embeddedness emphasizes the macro 
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level factors such as country differences and industry advancement and their effect on 
network formation.   
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Throughout the literature, many benefits have been proposed as a result of firm 
alliances and networks. Since strategic alliances constitute the most dominant type of 
inter organizational networks (Hitt et al., 2007), the emphasis has been specially placed 
on the results of strategic alliances. According to resource dependence theory, alliances 
can help firms in creating the needed and complementary resources (Ahuja, 2000; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1998). Moreover, alliances can facilitate access 
to resources in faster ways than developing them in house (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 
2007). Alliances can also help firms reach economies of scale (Jarillo, 1988).  
  Not only do networks serve as a viable conduit to transfer tangible assets, but 
they can also be a great source of learning through the transfer and creation of knowledge 
(Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Powell et al., 1996). Moreover, alliances can play a 
significant role in accelerating the learning process of participating firms (Kale et al., 
2000) and improving the innovative activities of firms (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).  
 The formation of alliances and networks can be an important tool in the 
competitive strategy of firms (Jarillo, 1998; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  They can 
be a response to competitors’ alliances (Gimeno, 2004) and facilitate the sharing of risks 
and costs of new projects (Das & Teng, 1996; Powell, 1990). Alliances also help firms to 
have access to new markets (Powell, 1990). Powell (1990) argues that alliances can help 
firms to achieve vertical disaggregation (reducing the reliability of large scale 
organizations that results from the large structural inertia of big companies).  
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 Studies of networks’ effect on performance have yielded mixed results in the 
literature. Peng and Luo (2000) investigate the effects of the interpersonal networks and 
the performance of firms in a Chinese sample. They find that the interpersonal networks 
between managers and top executives of other firms and government official influence 
the performance of firms. They conclude that these networks are necessary for 
performance but not sufficient. Lincoln et al. (1996) argue that membership in a keiretsu 
network has a positive effect for firms with previously negative results. However, 
negative performance figures are also reported for firms with previously good results.  
As mentioned above, resource dependence theory indicates that alliances are 
important mechanisms to reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Many scholars 
have confirmed this argument and present networks as a way to cope with uncertainty 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991; Hoffmann, 2007; Nohria & Garcia Pont, 1991). In addition to 
environmental and market uncertainty, the network, as a hybrid mode between market 
and hierarchy, can help in reducing opportunistic behavior faced by firms through 
interaction in the open market (Williamson, 1991). Finally, alliances can enhance the 
legitimacy of a firm by connecting it with legitimate actors (Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
Alliances can also improve the reputation of firms by associating their image with well 
reputable firms (Larson, 1992).   
Before moving on to a discussion of network structures, it is noteworthy to point 
out that there are many studies that have attempted to cross the line between the 
individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis. Multilevel network studies try to 
“zoom back and forth” between individuals and collective levels of analysis (Ibarra et al., 
2005) to have a comprehensive view of the effect of social networks on economic actions 
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(Uzzi, 1999; Rosenkopf et al., 2001). For instance, Mehra et al. (2006) combine 
individual and group level networks in one framework and explain that both networks 
influence group performance. Oh et al. (2006) take the same approach to study group 
networks and emphasize the role of individual intragroup networks and intergroup 
networks to examine group effectiveness. Other studies measure the effect of individual 
networks on organizational networks (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati & 
Westphal, 1999; Larson, 1992; Rosenkopf et al., 2001). 
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“Consider carbon atoms, which may be structured in different 
ways. One arrangement yields graphite, the soft, greasy, black 
substance used in pencils. Another yields diamonds, the hardest 
known substance found in nature.” (Parkhe et al., 2006: 561) 
 
Network structure refers to the presence of lasting patterns of relationships among 
actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For the purposes of this research, I will focus on 
inter organizational network structures which refer to “the overall pattern of relationships 
within which the industry is embedded” (Gulati et al., 2000: 205).  There is no scholarly 
consensus about the dimensions of a network structure; different scholars present 
different dimensions.  For instance, Gulati et al. (2000) argue that network structure can 
include network density, structural holes, structural equivalence, and core vs. peripheral 
firms. On the other hand, Provan et al., (2007) provide more detailed features of network 
structure such as in degree and out degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness 
centrality, multiplexity, broker relationships, and cliques.  
One of the major dimensions of network structure that have been investigated in 
many studies is centrality. For example, Ahuja et al. (2009) connect the centrality of 
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firms with their resulting alliance formation. Human and Provan (1997) try to connect the 
centrality of a firm in its network and its performance. The other dimension of network 
structure that is widely used is small world property (Milgram, 1967). A network that has 
a small world property will consist of many dense clusters of actors, and these clusters 
are connected by a short path length (Kogut & Walker, 2001). Conyon and Muldoon 
(2008) provide a good summary for the use of small world property in management 
literature.      
Throughout the literature, primary attention has been devoted to study the two 
opposite properties of network structure, structural holes and closure (Baum et al., 2010).  
What is common between the closure and structural holes arguments is that both 
emphasize the importance of social capital in creating a competitive advantage. In other 
words, both agree that better connected people have more social capital. However, each 
has a different view about the meaning of 'better' connected (Burt, 2000).  
Structural holes occur in a network when an actor’s partners do not maintain 
connections among each other (Burt, 1992). The logic behind the structural holes 
argument is that information circulates more within than between groups and the weak 
ties between groups are holes in the social structure of the market. Consequently, 
structural holes create a competitive advantage for an individual whose relationships span 
across the holes (Burt, 2000). Moreover, the structural holes argument indicates that 
structures exhibiting closure require redundant ties that post liabilities in terms of 
resources such as time and attention (Burt, 1992). Therefore, we can consider structural 
holes as an opportunity to broker and control the flow of information between people 
from opposite sides of the hole (Burt, 2000).  
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The other pole of the density dimension is the case of closure as presented by 
Coleman (1988). Closure can be obtained when actors in a network are all connected to 
each other. The logic behind the closure argument is that the closure of a network can be 
a good source of social capital for its members because it facilitates information 
diffusion. Furthermore, closure facilitates the creation and development of common 
routines and creates shared meaning which enhances trust and curbs the opportunistic 
behavior due to close monitoring (Coleman, 1988). In addition, the probability of 
unethical behavior is lower in dense networks due to the rapid diffusion of information 
about ethical wrongdoing from any member in a given network (Soda et al., 2004). 
Both closure and bridging have been shown to be advantageous under a range of 
conditions, but each displays a distinct temporal dynamic (Baum et al., 2010). Some 
authors argue that closure and holes are not contradictories and they might complement 
each other (e.g. Reagans & McEvily, 2008). As mentioned above, network studies can be 
conducted on three levels of analysis: the individual, group, and organizational. I will 
attempt to track the structure studies in the literature on these three levels of analysis 
because the contingencies of the three levels are different from each other. 
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The initial debate between Burt (1992) and Coleman (1988) about the superiority 
of closure vs. structural holes as a source of social capital was originally focused on the 
individual level of analysis. Burt (1992) conducted his study on individual managers 
while Coleman (1988) investigated individual students. Burt (1992) finds that managers 
who have a network that is rich with structural holes will have better results in terms of 
their promotions and power. On the other hand, Coleman (1988) studies the role of the 
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social structure around students and their probability of dropping out of school before 
graduation. He concludes that students with more closure in their social structure (family, 
school) will enjoy more social capital and a lower probability of dropping out of school.  
Support for Burt's theory is mounting on the individual level. In their study of two 
high technology electronics firms, Podolny and Baron (1997) find that senior managers 
with networks richer in structural holes are more likely to have early promotions.  
Mizruchi and Sterns (2001) point out that the probability of closing deals will be more for 
loan officers whose networks span many structural holes in the bank. Burt, Hogarth, and 
Michaud (2000) take their experiment to France and find that the probability of receiving 
a salary raise increases for managers who have many structural holes in their networks.  
Burt (2000) finds that the social capital of networks that span structural holes matters for 
managers’ performance, improving evaluations of the managers’ work, the probability of 
early promotion, and managers’ compensation relative to their peers. 
The closure argument has received support in the literature as well. For instance, 
Krackhardt (1999) shows a preference for closure and argues that individual networks 
with triadic or Simmelian ties (i.e. if a strong tie exists between A B and A C, there is a 
strong tie between B C), are more enduring and stronger than networks that do not 
maintain such ties. 
In the literature, the support of one of the theories over the other is not conclusive.  
Therefore, Burt (2000) proposes a contingency approach to settle down the debate 
between the two theories.  "A contingency factor is any variable that affects the strength 
of association between social capital and performance" (Burt 2000: 37). Consequently, he 
proposes three factors on the individual level that might affect the preference of one 
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structure against the other, namely culture and personality, content, and peers.  
Actors who have certain personality traits like “need for achievement” will have 
different network structure preferences than other individuals. In supporting this 
argument, Burt et al. (1998) conclude that the network structure varies systematically 
with the personality traits of the relevant actors. More specifically, he finds that actors 
with entrepreneurial attitudes tend to occupy hole rich networks.  Regarding the content, 
Burt (2000) differentiates between three types of relationships (friendship, business, and 
authority). Each type of relationship will create a different network structure preference.  
The influence of structural holes will be minimized when a manager has many peers in a 
position to undercut or denigrate the manager’s proposals. In support of the contingency 
approach, Moran (2005) indicates that the implications of closure are task dependent in 
such a way that closure improves the performance of managers at routine, execution 
oriented tasks but closure has less effect on new, innovation oriented tasks. 
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The debate between closure and structural holes has a different nature on the 
group level of analysis. Intragroup structures can be analyzed as to whether closure is 
more beneficial or holes. However, this comparison is hard to establish at the intergroup 
level because it is hard to achieve closure of intergroup relationships.  Closure will mean 
that all the members of a group should have extensive relationships with all members of 
the other groups in the firm which is hard to attain. Since the existence of intergroup 
closure is hard to achieve, the question will not be if closure is more beneficial than 
structural holes among groups; the relevant question focuses, rather, on whether 
structural holes are beneficial or not.  
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Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) use data from a newly created special unit within the 
Italian subsidiary of a multinational computer manufacturer to support the structural 
holes argument. They find that managers with cohesive communication networks are less 
likely to succeed in transforming their networks to meet new requirements. Zaheer and 
Soda (2009) find that teams in the Italian TV production industry that span many 
structural holes have better performance in terms of viewership. On the other hand, 
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) support the closure argument by investigating teams in five 
high technology companies. They conclude that teams that have more diversity 
(intragroup structural holes) have fewer evaluations of firm performance. They attribute 
the low performance to some problems in communication among team members.  
There are many contingencies that have been proposed at the group level. Reagan 
and Zuckerman (1999) study the performance of 223 corporate R&D units within 29 
major American firms in eight industries. They report that R&D teams that have denser 
networks of interaction achieve a higher level of productivity than those with sparse 
networks. However, they find that teams which are characterized by links between 
members who entered the organization at different points in time have more productivity 
than teams that include members who have the same tenure (differences in tenure imply 
that they have diverse reach and, consequently, structural holes outside the team). If we 
borrow the terminology of Soda et al. (2004), the results of Reagan and Zuckerman 
(1999) can be clarified by indicating that previous structural holes (due to variation in 
tenure) and current density among group members are good predictors of group 
productivity.   
In a study of the Italian television production industry, Soda et al. (2004) propose 
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the contingency of time. They argue that current structural holes within project teams, as 
opposed to past ones, and past closure rather, than current closure, help current team 
performance. Therefore, they conclude that structural holes are beneficial at different 
points in time. Burt (2000) proposes another type of contingency which can be regarded 
as a compromise with the closure argument. He argues for the necessity of structural 
holes in intergroup networks, but he also admits that closure is necessary within the 
group. In a study of the sales division of a financial services firm, Mehra et al. (2006) 
confirm that local density and external structural holes are related to group performance.   
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Throughout the literature, many studies have emphasized the benefits of strong 
and dense networks which support the closure argument. For instance, Nohria and 
Garcia Pont (1991) claim that in the global automotive industry, strategic blocks (dense 
networks) have a positive effect on firms’ performance. In their study of biotechnology 
startups, Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) argue that the greater the number of relations 
formed by a firm (dense networks), the more social capital the firm gains and the greater 
its probability of further alliances. Ahuja (2000) concludes that the positive effects of 
dense networks outweigh their negative effects. He also finds that an increase in the 
structural holes will have a negative effect on innovation. Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) point 
out that Toyota’s dense network increases its ability to efficiently create and manage 
network level knowledge sharing processes. Within the Canadian banking industry, 
Rowley et al. (2004) find that this industry enjoys many stable cliques and that the 
membership of these cliques has a positive effect on firm level benefits.  
The structural holes camp has already received a good support in the literature. 
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For example, in a study on Canadian mutual fund companies, Zaheer and Bell (2005) 
observe a positive relationship between focal firm performance and structural holes 
between its alliances. Along the same line, Baum et al. (2000) find that a startup in the 
Canadian biotech industry benefits from positioning itself among disconnected partners. 
Firms in geographical clusters that maintain networks characterized by many structural 
holes are well positioned to access new information, ideas, and opportunities (McEvily & 
Zaheer, 1999).  
The contingency approach for the preference of holes vs. closure has received 
much support from the scholarship on organizational networks. Some scholars advocate 
that the benefits of structural holes are contingent on external factors. For instance, Ahuja 
(2000) argues that the benefits of structural holes could be affected by the industry 
context. Rowley et al. (2000) indicate that the type of the industry affects structure 
preference. More specifically, they find that structural holes are optimal for the 
semiconductors industry and closure is optimal for the steel industry. Koka and Prescott 
(2008) point out that the performance indications of the two alternative structures are 
subject to environmental change and strategy, which means that the choice of structure is 
time dependent.  
In addition to external factors, many researchers indicated that the benefit of 
structural holes is contingent on network factors. For instance, Bae and Gargiulo (2004) 
connect the benefit of structural holes to the substitutability of partners in a network. 
They argue that organizations whose alliances with non substitutable partners are 
embedded in dense networks obtain better returns than firms occupying brokering 
positions between non substitutable partners.  
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Moreover, Baum et al. (2010) conclude that the benefits of closure, bridging, and 
hybrid network positions are contingent on the ages of ties constituting them. They found 
that the benefits associated with closure take time to develop, whereas those associated 
with bridging are often short lived. For hybrid positions, which combine elements of 
bridging and closure, a mix of established and new ties will be most advantageous. 
The benefits of structural holes vs. closure can also be affected by firms’ specific 
characteristics. For instance, Shiplov (2006) connects the benefit of structural holes to the 
specialization level of firms. More specifically, he finds that generalist and specialist 
banks can benefit more from structural holes than moderate specialization banks.  
Shipilov (2009) emphasizes another aspect of firms’ characteristics in relation to 
structural holes.  He argues that firms with a wide scope of experience and a high level of 
historic multimarket contact with their partners are able to extract the highest benefit 
from structural holes.   
Hite and Hesterly (2001) propose another contingency factor which is the age of 
the firm. They point out that a firm in its early stages will take advantage of more identity 
based (denser) ego networks. However, when the firm moves toward the next growth 
stage, the ego network becomes increasingly based on calculation (less dense).  
Hoffman (2007) argues that the benefits of closure vs. hole are contingent upon 
the pursued strategy of a firm. More specifically, when a firm needs to follow a shaping 
strategy (e.g. developing and introducing new technologies), dense networks will be more 
effective. On the other hand, if the firm wants to follow an adopting strategy (e.g. 
overcome high technological uncertainty), structural holes can provide better chances of 
success.   
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Capaldo (2007) reaches a compromise position and proposes that the integration 
of a large periphery of heterogeneous weak ties and a core of strong ties will lead to 
optimal results. Schilling and Phelps (2007) emphasize the same argument, holding that 
both holes and closure should exist together in order for a firm to take advantage of its 
network position. Firms embedded in alliance networks that exhibit both high clustering 
and high reach (short average path lengths to a wide range of firms) will have more 
innovative output than firms in networks that do not exhibit these characteristics 
(Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  
Provan and Sebastian (1998) also propose a compromise argument while studying 
the networks of mental health agencies in three US cities. They take a global view and 
measure the effectiveness of the networks as a whole. They note that networks with 
denser cliques tend to be more effective and that these cliques are connected through 
structural holes. They also suggest, however, that the density of the network as a whole is 
a poor predictor of network effectiveness. A summary for the researchers who 
participated in the closure vs. holes debate is presented in table (1). 
This review of contingency studies indicates that most studies are mainly 
concerned about contingencies related to firms’ specific characteristics and there is less 
emphasize on external factors. In this research, I contribute to the contingency approach 
by proposing an external factor that might affect the prevalence of one structure over 
another. I argue that the country in which the network structure is materialized will have 
an influence on the preference of holes over density or vice versa.  
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The strategic network perspective maintains that the embeddedness of firms in 
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networks of external relationships has significant implications for firm performance 
(Gulati et al., 2000). From the RBV perspective, the structural pattern of a firm’s 
relationships is unique and has the potential to result in competitive advantage (Gulati et 
al., 2000). Nohria and Garcia Pont (1991) emphasize that the position of a firm in its  
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network is an important part of its competitive tools. Therefore, I argue that the network 
structure is a major factor in determining the strategies of firms inside a network, and we 
have to fully understand such structures if we want to effectively influence the strategy of 
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firms. As Koka et al. lucidly explain, “Just as the architect needs to understand what 
makes buildings stay up rather than fall down, the network strategist needs to understand 
the elementary processes through which network structure comes about” (2006: 721).  
 The literature provides a mounting evidence for the effect of network structure on 
many outcomes related to their members. For instance, Zaheer and Bell (2005) find that 
among Canadian mutual fund companies, firms with superior network structures are 
better able to exploit their internal innovative capability which consequently enhances 
their overall performance. Baum, McEvily and Rowley (2010) argue that when the 
appropriate relational building blocks are in place, the structural features of network 
positions yield the predicted benefits of the structure. 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) argue that network structure is an important source of 
variation in the acquisition of competitive capabilities for job shop manufacturers (e.g. 
screw machining, stamping, sheet metal fabrication, and machining) in the US Midwest.  
More specifically, they find that geographical clusters that contain many structural holes 
and maintain ties to regional institutions provide their members with greater chances of 
accessing new information, ideas, and opportunities. 
Uzzi (1996) points out that the embeddedness of a firm in a network and the 
configurations of these networks (in terms of density and strength) will improve the 
survival chances of “better dress apparel” firms in the New York apparel economy. He 
also emphasizes that the positive effect of embeddedness reaches a threshold, after which 
the positive effect reverses itself. 
Rowley et al. (2000) find that steel industry networks that are denser will have a 
positive effect on firms’ performance in terms of Return on Assets (ROA), while sparser 
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networks in the semiconductor industry will have a greater effect on performance. In a 
study of mental health delivery networks in four U.S. cities, Provan and Milward (1995) 
indicate that the effectiveness of a network is determined by many structural variables, 
especially integration and centrality. Humman and Provan (1997) find that the network 
structure of small to medium enterprises (SME) has a significant influence on the firm 
outcomes, specifically transformational ones (changing the way that managers think and 
act due to participation in the network). 	 
 It has been explained that networks play a significant role in the survival of 
startups (Powell et al., 1996). Baum et al. (2000) add to this argument by emphasizing 
that not only do networks affect the survival of startups, but the network structure also 
plays a key role in affecting the probability that startups will survive. Thus, they point out 
that the startups in the Canadian biomedical industry which are able to configure their 
networks to provide access to more diverse information and capabilities exhibit a stronger 
initial performances and greater chances for future survival. 
 Another important influence of network structure is its effect on the future 
alliance formations. Nohria (1992) argues that the options available to network strategists 
are strongly influenced by current network structures. The current structure affects 
dynamic of network ties which will consequently affect that structure (Gulati, 1998). 
Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) indicate that the structural embeddedness of a firm has a 
significant effect on the future cooperative activities of that firm. Ahuja et al. (2009) 
conclude that a preexisting network structure constrains the formation of new alliances. 
More specifically, they note that firms that are poorly embedded in a network structure 
(occupying a peripheral position) are less likely to form alliances than firms that are well 
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embedded in their networks (occupying a central position).  
 Kogut (2000) explains that the structure of the Toyota network has facilitated the 
diffusion of innovation and norms which allow it to successfully transfer its operations to 
North America. Moreover, he argues that this structure has helped in creating and 
maintaining a specific network identity. Brass et al. (2004) also emphasize this point and 
argue that network structure helps to enforce norms and roles. Powell and Smith Doerr 
(1994) argue that members of densely formed networks possess a shared normative 
foundation. 
From the previous review, we can conclude that structural position that a firm 
occupies in its network will not only influence its performance, which has received the 
highest coverage, but also its ability to obtain resources as well as its future relational 
behavior. It has been found that network structure has a direct influence on many 
performance measures of firms such as innovation, growth, survival, and effectiveness. 
Structure also affects the ability of firms to access capital, information, and opportunities. 
Finally, structure affects the future relational behavior of a firm by affecting its 
probabilities of future alliances and affecting the identity of the network in which the firm 
is embedded in.       
Almost all studies in this literature deal with network structure as an independent 
variable. Very few attempts have tried to present network structure as a dependent 
variable. Madhavan et al. state that “managerial action can potentially shape networks so 
as to provide a favorable context for future action. In order to understand how managers 
may do this, research needs to move beyond asking how networks constrain and shape 
action, to examining what factors constrain and shape networks” (1998: 440). This study 
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proposes the same argument regarding the structure of networks and explores how 
networks and their structures are shaped.  
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The increasing use of networks in management science has not been accompanied 
by an effort to explain the difference in networking tendencies among countries. As 
Parkhe et al. suggest, “Surprisingly little attention has been paid, however, to the crucial 
cross national, cross cultural aspects of networks” (2006: 563). Some studies have been 
conducted outside the U.S., such as Canada (e.g. Baum et al., 2003; Shipilov, 2006), 
England (e.g. Shipilov, 2009), Japan (e.g. Gerlach & Lincoln, 1992), and Italy (e.g. 
Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000;	Soda et al., 2004; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). By combing the 
results of these studies together, we can obtain sufficient indications to suggest that inter 
organizational networks vary among countries. To obtain robust evidence regarding the 
variation in inter organizational network structures among countries, we need to perform 
a systematic comparison in one study.  
Few studies have attempted to compare individual managers’ networks among 
countries. In one noteworthy study, Burt et al. (2000) compare the social capital patterns 
between American and French managers and detect the effect of social capital on 
managers’ performance. They find that successful American and French managers tend to 
have structural holes in their networks. However, they notice that French managers build 
their relationships in a different way than their American counterparts. French mangers 
have a narrower range of contacts. Also, Americans attach positive emotions to bridging 
relationships, while French managers associate negative emotions with them. Brass et al., 
(2004) propose that Japanese employees have group orientation toward decision making 
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and US employees have individualistic decision making style, which may affect the 
density and interconnectedness of their interpersonal networks.   
There are some cross country studies that concentrate on other aspects of inter 
organizational networks besides structure. For instance Sakakibara and Dodgson (2003) 
conduct a cross country study in which they compare Strategic Research Partnership 
(SRPs) networks among three Asian countries: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. They 
concentrate on the different purposes that these networks serve and observe that SRPs in 
Japan, for example, compensate for the limited opportunities for mergers and for weak 
university research. In Korea, SRPs networks are established to promote large scale 
research projects. In Taiwan, on the other hand, SRPs are formed to facilitate 
technological diffusion.  
Lam (2003) compares the networking activities of US and Japanese MNEs in the 
UK. The results indicate that the US R&D laboratories are able to embed themselves in 
the UK’s local innovation networks more than the Japanese laboratories. In conclusion, 
the differences between the three countries’ national patterns of organization and 
innovation affect their networking activities and their benefits from these networks.  
In another study, Spencer (2003) conducts a structure comparison and investigates 
the establishment of knowledge diffusion networks for developing the FPD (Flat Panel 
Display) industry. The strength of this study is that it deals with the same industry for a 
specific period of time, and the only difference between networks is their geographical 
location. Interestingly, she finds that Japanese knowledge diffusion networks have more 
density and centrality than their North American counterparts and she notices no 
conclusive pattern for European networks. The difference between Spencer's study and 
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my research is that Spencer (2003) concentrates on knowledge diffusion network 
(citation patterns among industrial researchers’ publications), while in my study, I choose 
to focus on inter organizational networks (alliances, R&D, licensing, etc).    
In his book, Gerlach (1992a) tries to make a contrast between the networks in 
Japan and those in the US. He argues that strategic alliances in the US differ from the 
Japanese keiretsu in that the former alliances include a set of specific business activities 
(e.g. developing a new technology), while in Japan, alliances include a multiplex array of 
direct and indirect ties among banks, industrial firms, and commercial enterprises that 
create a complex web of interests among firms. This multiplicity norm regarding 
alliances in Japan creates denser networks.  Gerlach (1992b) maintains that the existence 
of highly visible clique like patterns based on inter organizational alliances, or keiretsu, 
is one of the major characteristics of the Japanese economy. 
Japan is not the only country that has a keiretsu like cooperation arrangement; 
many countries in the Asia Pacific region exhibit such norms of cooperation, in the form 
of Chaebol in South Korea and business groups in other countries (Dacin & Delios, 
2005), which vary from the norms of networking in the western world (Hamilton & 
Biggart, 1988). Ouchi (1981) admires Japan for its between firm cooperation and argues 
that firms in the US rarely trust each other enough to form such inter firm relationships. 
Lincoln et al. (1996) argue that American firms exhibit fewer grouping patterns around 
elites and major banks than their Japanese counterparts do. We can conclude that the 
general structure for the inter firm networks in US tends to have moderate density and 
less centrality.   
In general, Hagedoorn (2006) argues that there are international differences 
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regarding the propensity to engage in alliances and build networks.  These differences in 
cooperative tendencies lead to different inter organizational network structures around 
the world.  In the following sections, I propose the factors that I believe to affect the 


























Inter organizational relationships are “inherently” and “inescapably” multilevel 
phenomena because organizations are nested within dyadic relationships that are nested 
within networks of organizations, which in turn are nested within industries, national 
economies, and cultures (Klein et al., 2000b). As such, this study adopts a multilevel 
model that uses broad societal characteristics to explain the variation of network 
structures as a firm level construct. The variables of the study will span two levels of 
analysis: i) country level variables that include institutional profiles as the independent 
variables and resource availability as the mediating variables and ii) firm level variables 
that include ego network density as the dependent variable. 
The major challenge for this study is to determine the factors that affect network 
structure. Since there is no clear model concerning these factors in the literature, we will 
attempt to explore the forces affecting changes in structure. Network structure represents 
regular patterns of interaction between actors (Anderson et al., 1999). The most dominant 
regular pattern of interaction between organizations is the formation of strategic alliances 
(Hitt et al., 2007), indicating that alliances are the building blocks of networks. Thus, 
many of the structural measures of a network can be changed by simply adding new ties 
and alliances. For instance, adding a new alliance to a central firm might increase its 
centrality measure. Also, having new alliances between a firm’s partners might 
significantly reduce the value of the firm’s measure of structural holes. We can therefore 
conclude that factors affecting alliance formations would significantly influence their 
overall configurations and network structures.   
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As the literature suggests, alliance formation can be explained under two broad 
classifications: social and strategic (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The strategic 
explanation emphasizes why firms form alliances, while the social explanation 
concentrates on general factors that affect the opportunities for establishing alliances 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
This research utilizes the strategic and social explanations to understand the 
formation of alliances that affect network structure. This view is supported by Koka et al. 
(2006) who emphasize that network structure is shaped by both the strategic action of 
organizations and other environmental influences. In particular, this study argues that 
organizational action in terms of alliance activities is best explained by the resource 
procurements that are presented by resource dependence theory and the environmental 
effects that are presented by institutional theory. 
Resource dependence theory has been one of the major theories advancing the 
strategic explanation of alliance formation (Baum et al., 2003). From a resource 
dependence perspective, firms enter into alliances to secure resource procurements and to 
reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). On the other hand, the social explanation 
of alliances revolves around the institutional view of alliances. From the perspective of 
institutional theory, alliances are formed to obtain legitimacy in order for firms to have 
greater access to needed resources and support from the environment (Oliver, 1990).  
Dacin et al. (2007) provide five types of legitimacy that firms try to acquire through 
alliances. These types are market, relational, social, investment and alliances legitimacy, 
and firms enter into alliances to satisfy one or more of these types of legitimacy.     
Since the main purpose of this research is to compare the structure of networks 
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among countries and explain the factors that affect these structures, it is important to use 
constructs that are comparable across countries. Resource dependence theory can provide 
such constructs like the availability of resources, which varies among countries. By 
contrast, all other strategic explanations of alliance formation, such as transaction cost 
economies (e.g. Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2002) or the resource based view (e.g. 
Chung et al., 2000), provide firm level constructs that render it difficult to compare 
country level factors affecting network structure. Institutional theory can also provide the 
institutional profile (Kostova, 1999) as a comparable construct that varies across 
countries.  
Combining the institutional theory and resource dependence theory in a single 
study is a common feature in the literature. Greening and Gray (1994) argue that the 
variability in intra organizational structures can be explained by using institutional and 
resource dependence theories. Oliver (1990) presents a framework that is considered as a 
standard reference for the causes of alliance formation in which she indirectly explains 
how institutional and resource dependence theories help to identify a range of strategic 
and tactical responses to the institutional environment. She suggests six comprehensive 
determinants that can be subsumed in one of the two theories; for institutional theory, 
these are: i) necessity and ii) legitimacy, and for resource dependence theory they consist 
of: iii) asymmetry, iv) reciprocity, v) efficiency, and vi) stability.  
In conclusion, institutional theory and resource dependence theory can work 
together in serving as a sufficient basis for explaining network structure. Accordingly, the 
following is a quick review of the two theories, focusing in particular on their 
relationships with inter organizational networks. The general model of this study is 
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In his review of institutional theory, Scott (2005) argues that institutional theory 
emphasizes the process by which structures, rules, norms, and routines become 
established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. It investigates how these 
norms and routines have been created, diffused, and adopted over space and time. He also 
points out that institutional theory is concerned with how norms and rules fade away and 
their authoritative power declines through the process of institutional change. 
Institutional theorists try to explain actions that cannot be explained by economic and 
strategic tools, and they “emphasize the extent to which firm behavior is compliant, 
habitual, unreflective, and socially defined” (Oliver, 1997: 699). 
A more specific definition of institutional theory highlights how the social 










































comply with industry norms in order to gain legitimacy, which is defined as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995:574). Legitimacy is considered vital because it can be a 
resource for gaining other resources	 6Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002)	To gain legitimacy, 
firms are under pressure to act alike (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and to conform to the 
environment (Suchman, 1995), which eventually leads to “isomorphic” behavior among 
firms and creates homogeneity in the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Many applications for institutional theory have been proposed in the literature.  
Thus, some scholars advocate for the introduction of an institutional based view to the 
domain of strategy to complement the already existing industry and resource based views 
(Peng, 2002; Peng et al., 2008). The institution based view is a response to the criticism 
of ignoring the importance of context (Peng et al., 2009). The view considers the strategic 
choice of an organization as a result of its dynamic interactions with institutional 
environments (Peng, 2002). The two core propositions of the institutional based view are 
that: i) strategic choices are taken within the formal and informal constraints of an 
institutional environment and that ii) informal institutions can reduce uncertainty and 
provide guidance and legitimacy where formal institutions are missing (Peng et al., 
2009). 
Drawing on institutional theory, the construct of a “country’s institutional profile” 
captures the institutional characteristics of a national environment (Kostova, 1999). “A 
country’s institutional profile reflects the institutional environment in that country 
defined as the set of all relevant institutions that have been established over time, operate 
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in that country, and get transmitted into organizations through individuals” (Kostova, 
1997: 180). An institutional environment is composed of three pillars: i) the regulative, ii) 
the normative, and iii) the cognitive (Scott, 1995). The regulative pillar emphasizes the 
laws and rules that constrain and regulate behaviors. The normative pillar includes values 
and norms that specify how things ought to be done by defining goals and objectives and 
the appropriate ways to pursue them, what North (1990) calls the “rules of the game.” 
Finally, the cognitive pillar represents the widely shared social knowledge and cognitive 
categories (e.g. schemas and stereotypes) that people hold regarding specific 
phenomenon (Scott, 2005). 
Based on the institutional profile argument, the construct of “institutional 
distance” has been introduced to overcome the problems stemming from the construct of 
“cultural distance” (Kostova, 1999). “Institutional distance is the extent of similarity or 
dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two 
countries” (Xu & Shenkar, 2002: 608). Institutional distance has been used to explain 
many factors related to MNCs, such as their implementation and internalization of 
strategic practices (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002) and FDI decisions (Chan V 
Makino, 2007; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).   
The relationship between institutional theory and inter organizational networks 
has received a good support in the literature. For instance, institutional factors are 
portrayed as the main determinants of alliances and network formations (Dacin et al., 
2007; Oliver, 1990; Peng and Zhou, 2005). Oliver (1990) suggests two institutional 
determinants of alliance formation:  i) necessity and ii) legitimacy. The former explains 
that a firm establishes linkages with other organizations to meet legal or regulatory 
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requirements (Oliver, 1990), while the latter emphasizes that a firm participates in 
alliances to gain legitimacy by improving its reputation, image, or exhibiting congruence 
with the prevailing norms of its institutional environment (Oliver, 1990).  
Another connection between institutional theory and networks has been proposed 
by Dacin et al. (2007) who connect legitimacy and alliances in a single framework, 
proposing that there are many types of legitimacy objectives in alliance formation and 
that these play an important role in yielding significant technical benefits for firms and 
their alliances. Peng and Zhou (2005) present a different angle on the relationship 
between institutional theory and network structure and argue that institutional transition 
affects the network structure of firms in emerging economies. They suggest that business 
networks in Asia do not only differ in strength but also in content, highlighting how their 
evolution is driven by the impact of different dimensions of institutional transitions. 
The problem with the literature combining institutional theory and networks, 
however, is that there are few empirical attempts to clearly support this relationship. 
There are few noteworthy exceptions, nonetheless. For instance, Neuman, Davis and 
Mizruchi (2008) have conducted an empirical investigation on the board interlock 
networks of the US banking industry and found that institutional factors play a significant 
role in shaping network dynamics. They argue that the diminishing centrality of banks is 
partially a result of institutional pressure to reduce the size of boards.    
 In this research, I connect institutional theory and networks by arguing that the 
institutional profile of a country can be considered as a major factor affecting network 
structure. I use the institutional profile of a country because it captures all three 
dimensions of the institutional environment that affect firms. Many institutional studies 
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concentrate solely on the regulative aspects of institutions, especially those that are based 
on neo institutionalism in economics (North, 1990). However, consideration needs to 
also be given to the normative and cognitive pillars of a country because they have a 
great influence on networks, as relationships within networks reflect the norms and 
knowledge of cooperation in that country.  
 Accordingly, my study argues that network structures not only vary because of 
the differences in the regulative aspects of national institutions but also because of their 
normative and cognitive aspects. As a hypothetical example, I expect that the network 
structure in China will still differ from that of the UK, even if regulations in China 
become similar to those in the UK. In the Global Competitive Report (2007 2008) (Porter 
et al., 2007), UK scored 5.8 on the “efficiency of legal system” measure and ranked 14 
among the 131 countries listed, while China scored 3.6 on the same measure and ranked 
71. There is a clear difference in the strength of the regulative systems of these two 
countries, which might explain the differences in their network structures. I thus argue 
that even if China has a regulative system as strong as that of UK, both countries would 
continue to have different network structures. This is because, aside from strength of 
regulation, the knowledge base and norms that have been institutionalized in the Chinese 
environment favor obtaining resources through networking rather than through mergers 
and acquisitions.   
The study of institutional profiles in the literature can be practice specific (e.g. 
practices of quality management in Kostova and Roth, 2002), or domain specific (e.g. the 
domain of entrepreneurship in Busenitz et al., 2000). I will consider the institutional 
profile to be domain specific, and the domain will be inter organizational cooperation 
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(regulatory rules about the cooperative activities of firms and distribution of resources, 
the social norms and values about cooperative activities of firms and how firms should 
obtain their needed resources, and the shared social knowledge that people hold regarding 
cooperative activities of firms and how firms should secure resources). Below, I explain 
the expected relationship between each pillar of the institutional profile and network 
structure with examples from the literature. 
 
&&	0	 $%#	(%%	
Factors related to government intervention, the type of rules, and the strength of 
the legal system will be relevant to the discussion about the regulative pillar because they 
clearly affect the domain of inter organizational relationships. The literature suggests that 
government actions affect firms’ strategies. In a review of the influence of government on 
organizations, Pearce et al. (2009) conclude that a government’s stance with regards to 
organizational intervention has fundamental effects on organizational strategies, and the 
more attention governments devote to the strategies of independent organizations, the 
more likely government priorities are to shape managerial strategies. Since alliances and 
networking are an important part of firms’ strategies, it is reasonable to propose that the 
regulations, laws, and rules of a country will affect the cooperative tendencies of firms. 
There are many examples to illustrate how governments shape the structure of 
networks in their countries. Some governments directly impose policies that affect firms’ 
networking activities.  For instance, the US government interferes relatively little with the 
economic activities of firms (Spencer et al., 2005), and it does not deliberately impose 
cooperation between firms, meaning that this kind of government plays a minimal role in 
shaping firms’ cooperative activities and the structure of their networks. On the other 
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hand, governments of countries like Japan show more involvement in firms’ economic 
activities (Spencer et al., 2005), and they intentionally force firms to cooperate, 
eventually affecting the structure of their networks.  
  Governments can encourage collaboration by establishing research partnerships 
between firms and direct public funding for such partnerships. Sakakibara and Dodgson 
(2003) claim that the governments of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan participate in and 
support the establishment of Strategic Research Partnerships. Similarly, Spencer (2003) 
provides the example of Japanese government policies that bring firms together in 
research consortia to accelerate the development of LCD, plasma displays, and other 
technologies.   
The Helmholtz Association of German Research Center is an example of 
government support for collaborative activities among firms. This center is sponsored by 
the German government with an annual budget of approximately 3.3 billion Euros, and it 
consists of 17 scientific technical and biological medical research centers that collaborate 
with each other (Helmholtz Association, 2011). The creation of such partnerships and 
consortia influences network structures because it strengthens ties between firms and 
increases the density of their networks. 
Some governments enforce cooperation between firms by awarding government 
contracts to consortia as opposed to single contractors.  Such a policy encourages firms to 
cooperate and to become familiar with one another.  The familiarity and trust that arise 
between partners will increase the probability of their future involvement in strategic 
alliances (Gulati, 1995). These new alliances increase the density of the networks because 
they add more ties.   
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The effect of governments on network structures is not restricted to promoting 
cooperation, but they are also involved in preserving the existing ties between firms. For 
example, Hamilton (1996) asserts that the states of Japan and South Korea play 
considerable roles in supporting the maintenance of their network integrated economies. 
 In addition to direct intervention in the networking decisions of firms, 
governments can propose rules that have a significant influence on firms’ cooperative 
tendencies. Ownership laws are a very important example of these rules because, as part 
of the institutional environment, they affect the entry mode of foreign MNCs (Davis et 
al., 2000). In many countries such as China, governments restrict the foreign ownership 
of local firms. These restrictions force foreign MNCs to choose alliances as their 
preferred entry mode into local markets. The waves of international partners, in turn, 
change the cooperation dynamics between local firms by adding new links to the existing 
network, consequently affecting the structure of networks in that country.     
Arrighetti, Bachmann, and Deakin (1999) argue that the institutional framework 
for exchange, as constituted by the system of contract law, has a significant effect on the 
contractual agreements among firms. In a comparison between the UK, Germany, and 
Italy, Arrighetti et al. (1999) found that the contract law doctrine in Germany and Italy 
formally places greater stress on the value of cooperation than is the case with British 
common law.  
Gerlach (1992) proposes a strong argument that American regulations encourage 
firms to perform fewer alliances and more acquisitions.  He states that “since American 
law has taken a far more relaxed attitude toward transactions within vertically integrated 
firms, firms in the United States have sought to use full scale acquisition to internalize 
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many strategic business operations that their Japanese counterparts manage through inter 
firm transactions” (1992: 24). If the regulative environment in a country supports more 
cooperation between firms, the number of ties among firms will be higher, which means 
higher network density in that country. Furthermore, in response to his question, “Why 
are network arrangements so common in some nations and some actors and not others?” 
(327), Powell (1990) suggests that state policies dictate the easiness with which firms 
cooperate.  
In addition to the type of regulative system and government interference, the 
strength of the legal system is also an additional factor affecting a country’s network 
structure. As described in the Global Competitiveness Report (Porter et al., 2008), 
countries with strong legal systems have stronger intellectual and property right 
protections, more efficient legal frameworks, more transparency in government 
policymaking, and stronger auditing and reporting standards. On the other hand, countries 
that have weak legal systems are characterized by inefficient formal conflict resolution, a 
lack of adequate disclosure, and erratic law enforcement. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that business groups, as dense networks, can 
compensate for institutional voids in emerging economies. Close relationships within 
dense networks create and develop common routines and shared meanings, which 
enhances trust and curbs the opportunistic behavior of firms (Coleman, 1988).  In dense 
networks, any deviation from the shared norms of trust is highly punished by the group. 
Moreover, dense networks reduce the probability of unethical behavior because 
information about ethical wrongdoing is easily circulated within the network (Soda et al., 
2004). Coleman (1988) emphasizes this point by arguing that dense networks provide 
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close monitoring opportunities for the behavior of an individual firm by group members. 
The combined effect of the trust norms and close monitoring may compensate for the 
need for strong legal systems to resolve business conflicts. 
Weak regulative environments increase the level of uncertainty, which can be 
defined as the lack of information in an environment, given a specific decision making 
scenario (Dess & Beard, 1984). When an organizational environment, or a particular 
component of that environment, is perceived to be unpredictable, we experience what 
Milliken (1987) calls “state uncertainty.” He asserts that state uncertainty means one does 
not understand how an environment’s components might be changing, and actors are 
unable to predict the future behavior of key competitors or the government (such as the 
inability of firms to predict whether Congress will deregulate their industry).  
McKelvie et al. (2008) propose that uncertainty can emerge from a lack of 
information about a particular environment. The regulative environment of a country 
directly affects the availability of information about the different industries. To 
summarize, countries with more articulated and stronger legal systems have less 
environmental uncertainty for many reasons. Chief among these are that: i) the actions of 
government are more predictable, ii) the availability of information is high, iii) 
government is expected to ease any external causes of uncertainty, and finally, iv) firms 
have more formal mechanisms to cope with uncertainty.  
As the foregoing discussion suggests, firms participate in denser networks in the 
case of unstable environments by seeking to build more alliances, the building blocks of 
networks, to cope with greater uncertainty (Baum & Oliver, 1991). For example, joint 
ventures were the preferred mechanism used to cope with environmental uncertainty in 
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Hong Kong from the 1976 to 1986 period (Gilbert, 1996) Thus, under conditions of 
general uncertainty, firms tend to reinforce their existing affiliations (Beckman et al., 
2004), leading to denser networks.  Moreover, Nohria and Garcia Pont (1991) emphasize 
that strategic blocks act similarly in the case of shocks; the denser the ties, the less the 
effect of uncertainty is. Schilling and Phelps (2008) argue that when the industry 
environment is characterized by uncertainty, firms are encouraged to form more 
alliances, leading to a majority of firms in the industry being actively engaged in 
alliances and to a higher rate of alliance activity per firm. In summary, weak legal 
systems (low score on the regulative pillar) encourage firms to build denser networks in 
order to offset the lack of legal order and to make the environment more predictable by 
reducing uncertainty. 
In conclusion, a country that has an efficient and more articulated regulative 
system is more likely to have a high score on the regulative pillar of its institutional 
profile. In general, such countries are characterized by less environmental uncertainty and 
greater economic freedom. In addition, networks in these countries will tend to have less 
density.  
	
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: The lower the score on the regulative pillar of a country’s 




In addition to the effect of the regulative institutional environment on inter 
organizational relationships, the normative and cognitive institutional environments are 
expected to play a similar role in affecting relationships between firms (Arrighetti et al., 
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1999). Dei Ottati (1994) argues that formal and informal institutions complement each 
other in creating an economic and social environment in which constructive forms of 
cooperation can be created among firms.  
This study argues that the values and social norms that people hold regarding 
cooperation among firms (networks) will affect how firms cooperate and the number of 
alliances they initiate. This tendency toward more alliances will consequently affect the 
network structure of the industries in that country. Dacin et al., (2007) highlight how 
some industries lack a history of using alliances as a strategic choice and how many of 
the firms in such industries have tended to limit their business activity to pure 
competition, acquisition, or diversification. In these industries, alliances are not a 
legitimate strategic option (Dacin et al., 2007), which means far fewer alliances and 
looser network structures.  
In comparison to other industries, the biomedical industry is characterized by 
norms of cooperation. Powell et al. explain the networking tendencies in that industry by 
stating that “when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding and 
the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in 
networks of learning, rather than in individual firms” (1996: 116). Even though the norms 
of cooperation are prevalent in the biomedical industry in general, it is expected that the 
strength of these norms will vary among countries.    
A country’s collaboration norms are usually a result of its historical path, an 
important example being the economic system for recovery after World War II. For 
instance, with regards to the norms of alliance formation in Japan following the war, 
Keiretsu groups reflect the prewar period’s alliance patterns, i.e. Zaibatsu groups 
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(Gerlach, 1992b). Keiretsu groups continue to dominate the Japanese economy today 
(Gerlach, 1992b). The domination of Keiretsu groups has even more intensified because 
they are considered to be a defensive mechanism against new comers to the Japanese 
market (Gerlach, 1992a). 
One important norm that affects network structure is the prevailing views on 
competition. Spencer (2003) advocates that the ideology of business practices in some 
countries supports competition among firms, leading to less density in the networks of 
knowledge sharing. In general, if the norms of an industry are concentrated around 
partnerships, the number of alliances and ties among firms will increase, which magnifies 
the density of networks within that industry. 
Not only do competition norms vary among industries, but they also differ among 
countries. Ingram and Yue (2008) argue that different countries have different views of 
cooperation vs. competition. These norms establish the optimal path for firms to follow 
for securing needed resources. The propensity toward competition in a country 
encourages firms to obtain their needed resources by either arm length contracts or 
through acquisitions, which in turn reduces the country’s network density. On the other 
hand, the tendency toward cooperation increases the social trust and encourages firms to 
obtain their resources through networking, leading to higher network density.  
Powell (1990) indicates that U.S. firms were historically more hesitant to engage 
in collective industrial research than the Japanese and Europeans. He asserts that 
Americans view collective research as a “form of collusion and as seedbed for 
anticompetitive practices” (1990: 317). He also emphasizes that U.S. firms have been 
reluctant to share their best scientists and most attractive projects even though they have a 
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shared view about the importance of collaborative R&D in adapting to the changing 
nature of technology development. Similarly, Garud and Karnoe (2003) point out that in 
the wind turbine industry, actors in Denmark show greater commitment to their 
interactions with one another, while their American counterparts exhibit a lower quality 
of interaction due to the antagonistic attitudes between competitors. Spencer (2003) 
explains these differences between the tendencies of Danish and US firms to share 
information by suggesting that the corporatist norms in Denmark support more 
cooperation and knowledge exchange between competitors than the associational norms 
of the US.  
Spencer (2003) advocates the existence of two conflicting national political 
institutional structures, namely pluralist and corporatist. In corporatist countries like the 
Scandinavian countries and Japan, national interest groups participate in the decision 
making structure of the state, while in pluralist countries, like the US, UK, and Australia, 
independent interest groups that target specific issues are the norm (Wiarda, 1997). 
Spencer et al. (2005) argue that countries with pluralist norms tend to have more 
competition between firms and less cooperation between competitors. Societies with 
corporatist norms, on the other hand, tend to have more collaboration and mutual 
adaptation among competitors while they compete for market share. More collaboration 
among firms in corporatist societies means more ties and greater network structure 
density. 
Another collaboration norm that can affect a country’s network structure concerns 
industry university collaboration. The collaborations between universities and firms bring 
complementary resources to both parties. University research centers have access to 
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intellectual resources and advanced infrastructure; industrial firms, on the other hand, 
have practical expertise, financial resources, internship opportunities for students, and 
employment opportunities for graduates and students (Santoro & Gopalakrishnan, 2000). 
Thune (2007) argues that in some technology intensive industries such as biotech, there is 
a greater tendency for industry university collaboration.  
Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2000) argue that the knowledge transfer activities 
between industrial firms and universities can be institutionalized within firms. I argue 
that this norm can be institutionalized at the country level as well. In support of this 
argument, van Beers, Berghall, and Poot (2007) indicate that Finland’s norms exhibit a 
greater tendency for networking and the integration of firms and universities into a 
national innovation system than the Netherlands. The norms of industry university 
collaboration in a country will increase the number of collaborative activities and, 
consequently, the density of its networks.  
Another example of industry university collaboration is the establishment of 
scientific parks. These types of parks contain many types of companies in addition to 
university spinouts. Many of these parks function under university supervision. One such 
park is Nottingham’s BioCity, which is one of Europe's largest bioscience incubators that 
hosts over 70 companies. BioCity is the result of an effective collaboration between 
Nottingham Trent University, The University of Nottingham, and the East Midlands 
Development Agency. It includes many new startups, established SMEs, international 
companies, and university spinouts (BioCity Nottingham, 2011). Such scientific parks 
foster greater collaboration between industry and universities and between the companies 
within them, increasing a country’s network density.  
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The normative pillar of inter organizational relationships emphasizes that the 
norms of cooperation prevail in specific countries. At the individual level, some countries 
will have individuals who are integrated into strong cohesive groups; these individuals 
have longer and more intimate social interactions (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii & Bechtold, 
2004). The tendency toward greater collective action is well documented in the cross 
cultural literature as collectivism (e.g. Hofstede, 1984; Kim et al., 1994; Triandis, 1995).  
Hofstede (2001) explains that collectivistic societies are characterized by strong and 
cohesive ties, while individualistic societies are characterized by looser ties among 
individuals.  
Culture can be defined as “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the member of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 
2001:9). How societal culture can affect the strategy of firms, particularly in terms of 
alliances for the purposes of our research, can be justified by many theoretical 
explanations, notable of which is cultural immersion theory which suggests that people 
from the same culture share the same schemas that are reflected in their organizations 
(Dickson et al., 2004).  
While there remains a heated debate over the use of culture as a component for 
measuring countries’ institutional profiles, this practice is being increasingly adopted 
(e.g. Ang & Michailova, 2008; Parboteeah et al., 2008). For instance, Scott (2001) 
provides three institutional pillars, of which the third is the “culture cognitive pillar.” He 
argues that the internal interpretive processes that constitute the frames through which 
meaning is made are shaped by external cultural frameworks. This supports the argument 
that the attitude of managers and the strategic orientation of their firms are shaped by a 
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society’s collectivistic culture. Thus, in support for their utilization of culture as a main 
component of the normative pillar, Parboteeah et al. (2008) argue that Busenitz et al.’s 
(2000) conceptualization of the normative aspect of a country’s institutional profile is 
similar to the concept of national culture.  
In order to consider the normative/cultural dimension, Parboteeah et al. (2008) 
follow Kostova’s (1997) recommendation to use only those elements that the theory 
considers most relevant to the issue under investigation. In this research, the dimension of 
collectivism is strongly relevant to the cooperative orientation of organizations. Kumar 
and Das (2011) choose to use the construct of collectivism vs. individualism to the 
exclusion of any other cultural constructs in explaining the link between culture and 
legitimacy management in international alliances. They argue that collectivism has direct 
implications for how partnering firms embedded in different cultures view partnerships.   
There are a few works that attempt to connect network research to culture. For 
instance, Rowley and Baum (2008) have compared the findings of Conyon and 
Muldoonof (2008) regarding the mechanisms of tie formation and termination in the UK 
with previous research about these interlock networks in the US and Germany. They 
noticed real differences between these networks and suggest that these differences could 
be attributed to cultural variations.  
In this research, culture can be a major component of the normative pillar as well 
as the cognitive pillar. For the normative pillar, the “practiced” collectivism as presented 
in the GLOBE study (Gelfand et al., 2004) will be used since it represents the actual 
norms of collectivism, while the “value” collectivism will be used in the cognitive pillar 
because it represents the knowledge about collectivism. The collectivistic attitudes of 
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individuals in these countries will be reflected in their decisions to establish greater ties 
and alliances. 
The construct of collectivism (as an opposite dimension to individualism) has 
received much attention in the literature, with about 1400 studies using this construct 
over a 25 year period (Gelfand et al., 2004). Collectivism explains the nature of the 
relationship between the individual and the group (Gelfand et al., 2004). The GLOBE 
study differentiates between two types of collectivism. The first type is institutional 
collectivism, which is defined as “the degree to which organizational and societal 
institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and 
collective action” (Javidan, House, & Dorfman, 2004: 30). The second type is the in 
group collectivism or “family collectivism” (Brewer & Venaik, 2011); this is defined as 
“the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their 
organizations or families” (Javidan et al., 2004: 30).  
Hofstede (1980) describes individualistic societies as societies in which the ties 
between individuals are loose and an individual is expected to look after himself and his 
direct family. Collectivistic societies, on the other hand, are characterized by strong and 
cohesive ties among individuals. The distinction between in group and out group is a 
major characteristic of collectivistic individuals (Triandis, 1995). Therefore, it can be 
argued that collectivistic societies tend to have individuals who are integrated into strong 
cohesive groups, and individuals in such societies are more likely to have longer and 
more intimate social interactions (Gelfand et al., 2004). While the construct of 
collectivism has been studied on three levels of analysis, namely societal, organizational, 
and individual (Gelfand et al., 2004), this study concentrates on societal level 
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collectivism because it is an attempt to detect the effect of country level factors on the 
network structure.  
In summary, countries that have a high score on the normative pillar tend to value 
collaboration more than competition, have higher university industry collaboration, and 
have a high score on practiced collectivism. Firms in countries that have a high score on 
the normative pillar will have greater collaboration, which increases the number of ties in 
their networks and, consequently, the density of these networks.  
	
	 : The higher the score on the normative pillar of a country’s 




In the literature, the cognitive pillar is presented either as a knowledge, from a 
value perspective, of a certain phenomenon (e.g. Kostova, 1997), or as the institutions 
that foster the creation and diffusion of knowledge (e.g. Parbooteah et al., 2008). In the 
former case, the cognitive pillar includes the elements of society that have a ‘taken for 
granted’ nature (Kostova, 1997). For instance, Parboteeah et al. (2009) adopt the value 
perspective of knowledge by identifying five items that reflect belief in religion as the 
component of the cognitive pillar. In contrast, Parbooteah et al. (2008) followed the latter 
definition of the cognitive pillar by including the educational system as a major 
component of the gender equality’s cognitive pillar. 
In this research, the cognitive pillar will reflect the knowledge of inter 
organizational cooperation from a value perspective. This is due to the difficulties of 
identifying the institutions that create and transmit the knowledge of cooperation between 
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firms. Consequently, the cognitive pillar will be defined as the widely shared social 
knowledge and cognitive categories (e.g. schemas and stereotypes) that people hold 
(Scott, 2005) in regard to cooperation and alliances which affect the network structure in 
their country. The assumption here is that firms in some countries know how to 
cooperate, while in other countries, the knowledge of cooperation is not as widely 
available. In the former countries, we can recognize higher levels of social trust and 
lower levels of social loafing and opportunistic behavior. Social loafing refers to the 
reduced performance of individuals who act as part of a group rather than alone (Earley, 
1989). In other words, firms in countries that score high on the cognitive pillar show 
more cooperation with other firms and exhibit less opportunistic behavior toward their 
partners.  
As discussed concerning the normative pillar, culture is a component of the 
cognitive pillar. The valued collectivism construct will be the cultural variable, and it 
measures the “should be” form of collectivism. This construct concentrates on how 
respondents perceive and value personal relationships and family achievements. In 
countries with a high score on collectivism values, people learn more about how to 
cooperate at the individual and organizational levels. This knowledge of cooperation will 
encourage managers to perform more collaborative activities among their firms, which 
results in more alliances and denser network structures.  
In addition to collectivism, views on friendship can be considered as a component 
of the cognitive pillar because valuing personal relationships would, most probably, 
result in placing greater emphasis on inter organizational relationships. The analogy or 
the mutual effect of collectivism and personal friendships on inter organizational 
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relationships can be explained by the notion of “macro organizational psychology” (Staw, 
1991; Staw & Sutton, 1993). According to Straw and Sutton, “This area comprises theory 
and research that uses psychological constructs, especially constructs reflecting 
individual cognitions and emotions to explain the attribute and behavior of organizations” 
(1993: 370). In other words, “macro organizational psychology” explains how micro 
models can be used to explain macro actions. Accordingly, this study uses personal 
friendships to explain the macro action of inter organizational relationships.  
It is widely accepted that personal connections have a considerable influence on 
network formation. For instance, Larson (1992) indicates that the entrepreneurial 
personal relations of owners affect the tendency of their firms to establish networks. 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) also maintain that previous and current managerial 
connections are also shown to affect network formation. More specifically, Rosenkopf et 
al. (2001) found that middle management connections exhibit a considerable effect on 
network formation. In brief, societies that value collective actions and their residents 
value group achievements over individual ones are more likely to have greater 
collaboration between organizations as a reflection of the collaboration between 
individuals. In these societies, inter organizational networks are typically characterized 
by density, which reflects the density of their individual networks.   
Trust is also a major component of the cognitive pillar because it can be 
considered as a cognitive construct (Johnson & Grayson, 2005) and significantly affects 
the formation of organizational alliances (Gulati, 1995) and alliance performance (Zaheer 
et al., 1998). Inter organizational trust can be defined as an organization’s assumption 
that another firm will not act opportunistically (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). 
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The role of trust in alliances is explained according to different rationales in the 
literature. Gulati and Nickerson (2008) argue that trust between partners reduces 
transaction costs along with greater information exchange between partners; trust also 
facilitates problem solving and joint commitments, which enhance exchange performance 
(Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Arrighetti et al. (1999) conclude that trust plays an important 
role in offsetting asymmetries of power between contracting parties, promoting stability 
in trading relationships, which in turn increases the tendency for collaboration between 
firms. If we accept that trust affects the governance arrangement between partners (Gulati 
1995), we can conclude that the level of trust in a country will affect the knowledge of 
cooperation between firms in that country.   
Studies have shown that trust has a significant influence on network structures 
too. For instance, Baum et al. (2010) argue that trust is an antecedent and a consequence 
of network density. Gulati and Nicherson (2008) also argue that inter organizational trust 
will affect the strength of ties (make, ally, or buy) between partners. Partners usually 
participate in stronger forms of collaboration after accumulating trust through 
incremental small exchanges (Larson, 1992). Trust is very important for inter 
organizational relationships because it enhances exchange performance (Gulati & 
Nicherson, 2008) and is the mechanism by which the benefits of knowledge transfer are 
recognized (Levin & Cross, 2004). 
The prevalence of trust norms in a country will encourage firms to have more 
collaborative agreements as a means of expanding or having access to resources as 
opposed to expanding through acquisitions. This is because trust is an initial condition for 
the establishment of alliances and networks (Gulati, 1995). In support of this argument, 
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Ouchi (1981) argues that the lack of trust among American firms discourages them from 
having many inter firm relationships similar to those of Japan. Therefore, we argue that 
countries that have high levels of trust tend to have more alliances, which increases the 
density of networks in these countries. 
 In conclusion, countries that place greater emphasis on collectivism, personal 
relationships and friendships, and appreciate the value of trust are more likely to have a 
higher score on the cognitive pillar of their institutional profiles. A higher score on the 
cognitive pillar might result in more knowledge fostered on collaboration at the 
individual and organizational levels. Such countries are expected to see more alliances 
and inter organizational relationships, increasing their network density.  
	
	  The higher the score on the cognitive pillar of a country’s 




Relying on the models of power (Blau, 1964) and the argument of buffering the 
technical core (Thompson, 1967), Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) seeks to explore how power and dependence affect organizational choice and how 
organizations can buffer themselves from dependence and interdependence (Pfeffer, 
2005). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that the survival of an organization is contingent 
upon its ability to effectively manage the internal demands of the groups upon which it 
depends and upon its ability to acquire and maintain resources from the external 
environment.  
Pfeffer (2005) proposes three lines of inquiry that cover the resource dependence 
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literature: i) how resource dependence affects organizational decisions (e.g. how reliance 
on government funding affects a firm's adaptation to government policies); ii) how 
external interdependence affects the power mechanisms inside organizations 
(departments of an organization that help manage external constraints will have more 
power); and iii) how firms can manage interdependence (many techniques have been 
proposed such as manipulating regulative bodies, cooptation, mergers, and alliances).  
Resource dependence theory helps to explain alliance formation by highlighting 
that the uncertainty concerning the environment encourages firms to arrange contracts 
with other firms to guarantee their needed resources, thus establishing inter firm 
networks. In support of the resource dependence argument, Pfeffer and Nowak (1976)	
indicate that	 inter organizational linkages have been used to manage the inter 
organizational interdependence of American companies engaged in manufacturing and 
those in oil and gas extraction. Building on resource dependence theory, managing 
interdependence has been the most common explanation for the emergence of inter firm 
networks (Baum et al., 2003). From the previous arguments, we can conclude that firms 
have to secure resource procurement in order to reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  
Resource procurement is a major factor that encourages firms to establish 
networks. Oliver (1990) argues that a firm enters into an alliance to exercise power and 
control over another organization’s resources. We can identify three types of resources 
that firms usually seek from their network partners: i) firms establish networks to have 
access to capital (Lee et al., 2001; Uzzi, 1999); ii) firms participate in networks to have 
access to partners’ tacit knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Kale et al., 2000; Oxley & Sampson, 
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2004) and to learn from their partners (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Kogut 
1988; Powell et al., 1996); and iii) firms join networks to have access to technological 
resources (Baum et al., 2003).  
As mentioned above, firms generally enter networks to overcome the uncertainty 
in their environment by arranging access to their shortage of assets (Nohria & Garcia 
Pont, 1991). These assets can be technical assets (Baum et al., 2003), financial assets 
(Hoshi et al., 1990; Uzzi, 1999); or knowledge of practices and technologies (Baum et al., 
2000; Kogut, 1988). Firms usually follow different alliance strategies to obtain these 
different resources. Using the word “conduit” to describe the function of network ties 
(e.g. Ahuja, 2000), we conclude that different types of conduits are necessary to properly 
transfer different resources between allies. Thus, different complementarities result in 
different types of linkages and, consequently, different network structures.  
There is mounting evidence in the literature that firms’ network structures affect 
their abilities to access network specific resources. For instance, Gulati et al. (2000) 
indicate that the structure of the networks in which firms are embedded has a great 
influence on firms’ ability to capitalize on their network resources. Hite and Hesterly 
(2001) also argue that network structure is conducive to firm performance when it is 
aligned with and addresses a firm’s evolving resource challenges. Gulati (1999) proposed 
the concept of “network resources” to highlight the importance of the resources that a 
firm can obtain from its network. These resources, in addition to the structures of firms’ 
networks which are unique, can serve as a source of sustainable competitive advantage 





One of the most cited motivations for strategic alliances is having access to the 
partner’s tacit knowledge and learning new skills.  Oxly and Wada (2009) emphasize that 
alliances are very useful for transferring knowledge, and the structure of alliances (equity 
JV vs. licensing) plays a big role in this knowledge transfer. Srivastava and Gnyawali 
(2011) indicate that alliance portfolios (ego network) play a significant role in knowledge 
transfer and that the quality and diversity of network technological resources contribute 
to knowledge transfer and the resulting innovation. Moreover, Dagnino et al. (2008) 
emphasize the influence of the shared context of interaction, i.e. the network structure, on 
the knowledge generating and disseminating processes.   
Complex knowledge cannot be transferred easily; it needs strong cooperative 
activities to guarantee the efficiency of this transfer (Hansen, 1999) and to speed up the 
learning process (Kale et al., 2000). Therefore, we see firms enroll in some strong forms 
of alliance, such as joint ventures, to achieve learning objectives (Oxley & Sampson, 
2004). In addition to the strength of ties, the density of networks should have impact on 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge among network members.  
Srivastava & Gnyawali (2011) indicate that the benefit of an alliance network as a 
source of knowledge will be maximized for less endowed firms, while this benefit is 
reduced if a firm has high knowledge resource availability. I similarly argue that the need 
for networks to transfer knowledge will be minimized if knowledge is more readily 
available in the market or if there are some formal sources such as universities and 
research centers that can provide knowledge to firms.     
In some contexts, knowledge is fairly available and transfer of knowledge is 
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formal. In certain countries, especially developed countries, there is a significant presence 
of research institutions that can provide access to scientific developments. The existence 
of such institutions in certain countries reduces the role of alliances in obtaining this type 
of knowledge. In those countries, networks will have less density due to the fewer needs 
for alliance formation. 
	
	 The greater the availability of knowledge in a country, the lower 
the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry.   

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Related to the availability of knowledge, the availability of recent technologies in 
a country also affects its network structures. Previous research suggests that joint 
ventures are effective vehicles for accessing complex technology (Oxley & Wada, 2009). 
Baum et al. (2003) emphasize that access to technological resources is a main factor that 
determines the establishment of networks. Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo (2010) indicate 
that alliances could be the mechanism by which less endowed firms have access to new 
technologies that would otherwise be beyond their reach. In the same vein, Stuart (2000) 
asserts that alliances with firms that possess leading edge technological resources are the 
most valuable alliances and that they result in technological transfer and better 
performance.  
More specific to the biomedical industry, Anand et al. (2010) argue that due to the 
apparent heterogeneity among pharmaceutical firms’ biotech technological capabilities, 
pharmaceutical firms have often used alliances with biotech firms to build new 
technological competencies. Kogut and Chang (1991) note that joint ventures are the 
ways through which weaker Japanese’ firms have been able to acquire technology. 
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Furthermore, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) indicate that pharmaceutical firms initiate 
alliances with biomedical firms based on their complementarities and that they use 
alliances to transfer back new technologies. It is widely acceptable that strategic alliances 
mitigate technological uncertainties (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). Alliances help 
these firms share resources and technological knowledge in order to create new products 
and technologies (Bessy & Brousseau, 1998).  
In many hi tech industries, knowledge is widely dispersed and it is hard for one 
firm to have all the knowledge required to achieve the competitive advantage. In these 
industries, firms are encouraged to establish cooperative ties to develop a knowledge 
based advantage (Baum & Rowley, 2008). Baum and Rowley (2008) also argue that the 
major purpose of cooperative ties, among other things, is to have access to other firms’ 
complementary expertise and novel technological development. They conclude that the 
establishment of such cooperative ties will result in inter organizational networks that 
span and link the entire industry. Therefore, I argue that the role of alliances and 
networks as a conduit for the transfer of technology is very important in the biomedical 
industry because it is characterized by innovation and technological change. In this 
industry, it is hard for any firm to possess the full range of resources, expertise, and 
knowledge needed to develop new technologies (Teece, 1992). 
In conclusion, if certain countries do not have up to date technologies available 
on a large scale, firms are forced to form more alliances to have access to such developed 
technologies. More alliances lead to denser networks, which lead us to the following 
hypothesis.   
	
	  The greater the availability of technological resources in a 
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country, the lower the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry 
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Another strategic reason for companies to enter into networks is gaining access to 
financial resources (Uzzi, 1999). Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, and Santoro (2008) explain 
that biotech firms use alliances with pharmaceutical firms to have access to financial 
capital. They indicate that biotech firms can gain financial capital from alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms through debt or equity arrangements. Receiving money through 
alliances with pharmaceuticals not only helps biotech firms to finance their operations but 
also improves the valuation of small biotech firms (Janney & Folta, 2003).  
If capital can be raised from open markets, fewer relational alliances will be 
required, and, consequently, the networks will be less dense. On the other hand, if the 
capital is concentrated in the hands of controlling banks or business groups, strong 
relational alliances are required. In the latter case, networks will be denser with close 
relationships to capital sources. The relationships with financial institutions are not the 
only solution to raise capital; firms can have alliances to share the financial burden of 
new projects. In this case, networks play a substitute role for the less advanced financial 
market. This role is similar to the role of business groups in developing economies 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000). 
	
	 The more available the financial capital in a country, the lower 
the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. 

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The integration of institutional theory and resource dependence theory essentially 
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means that organizations exercise strategic choice, but do so within constraints imposed 
by their institutional environments (Greening & Gray, 1994). In the international business 
literature, many theorists have argued for more integration between institutional theory 
and resource dependency theory (Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng, 2001; Wright et al., 2005; 
Yamakawa et al., 2008). Meyer et al. (2009) combine the two views to analyze the 
strategies of foreign investors for entering emerging economies.  
To better integrate institutional and resource dependence theories in one 
framework, we have to understand how each theory describes the environment. Scholars 
of resource dependence theory concentrate on the “task environment,” with less emphasis 
on the effect of social and state pressures (Oliver, 1991). Moreover, the environment is 
mainly considered as a source of uncertainty. In a review of resource dependence 
research, Nienhüser (2008) has found that the major emphasis of that research is on the 
consequence of power and uncertainty reduction. There is less attention paid to the 
factors that create power imbalances and to the variation of environmental uncertainty. 
On the other hand, institutional theory has a broader view of the environment. We can see 
that the notion of the environment in institutional theory is much broader than that of 
resource dependence theory. However, there is less emphasis on the micro mechanisms 
of how institutional theory functions at the organizational level. Therefore, I believe that 
combining the two theories in one framework will help to reconcile the argument for the 
conformity of institutional theory and the strategic choice of resource dependence theory 
(Oliver, 1991), and will give us a better understanding of the structural differences among 
inter organizational networks.  
Institutions not only present the optimal intra  and inter organizational structure 
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that firms should comply with, but they also affect the task environment and limit firm 
choices. In general, firms can obtain the required resources for their survival by one of 
three means: i) by buying them from the open market, ii) by acquiring or merging with 
other firms that possess these resources, and finally, iii) by establishing a network of 
inter organizational relations to secure the flow of resources. The institutional 
environment shapes the distribution of resources in a way that makes some strategic 
actions, like networking, more rational than other strategic options, such as mergers and 
acquisitions. If this is the case, the network structure of organizations will be 
characterized by denser networks with stronger ties among organizations.  
The model of this study shows that the relationship between the institutional 
profile and the network structure is partially mediated by resource availability. Mathieu 
and Taylor (2006) provide three means to justify the sequence of effects in meditational 
models: i) experimental design feature, ii) temporal precedence, and iii) theoretical 
rationale. They argue that the theoretical rationale is the only basis for advancing a 
particular causal order in non experimental studies with simultaneous measurements of 
the antecedents, which is the case for this study.     
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), partial mediation can be clarified by 
showing that all the relationships in a model are significant. More specifically, to exhibit 
partial mediation, the model of this study should exhibit a significant relationship 
between the institutional profile and the network structure in addition to a significant 
relationship between resource availability and network structure. Below, I provide a 
theoretical argument to explain the order of the mediation relationship.  
Aside from the direct effect on network structures, the institutional profile of a 
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country can have an indirect effect by shaping the availability of resources for the firms 
operating within it. In other words, we can argue that the institutional environment 
(especially its regulative pillar) affects the strategies of firms (represented by their 
network strategies) by affecting the resource availability.  
For instance, the strength of property rights directly affects knowledge transfer 
and the alliances required for that transfer. The networks of knowledge transfer in 
countries with strong property rights will be less dense because there are formal 
mechanisms for knowledge transfer, creating weaker ties and more dispersed networks in 
these countries. On the other hand, transferring knowledge in countries with weak 
property rights requires strong connections to allow the informal channels to facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge.  
In countries with a deregulated banking sector, the financial capital will be 
distributed among many actors and extensive alliances are not required. If the banking 
industry is highly centralized, the economic system will consist of financial institutions 
taking center stage and all other economic activities evolving around them. Banks will 
represent central nodes that encourage denser and more intense networks, which is the 
case in Japan and Germany (Kogut et al., 2003). The existence of financial institutions at 
the apex of business groups creates certain network structures characterized by density 
and strong ties. Kogut et al. (2003) argue that there is a relationship between the 
centrality of banks in Japan and Germany and the establishment of business groups in 
both countries; they also emphasize the correlation between corporate and non financial 
centrality in the US and UK and their weak network structure. Unlike US banks, which 
are restricted by the Glass Steagall Act, Japanese banks typically maintain a holding of a 
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certain percentage of most of their main client companies’ stocks; the ability to hold 
equity and lend capital increases the centrality of banks in Japan (Gerlach, 1992). 
Moreover, the strength and the reliability of the regulative system have an 
influence on the knowledge outcomes in a country. For instance, Allred and Park (2007) 
observe that in developed economies, the strength of the regulations that organize patents 
positively affects R&D and domestic patent filings in that country.  
Since the institutional profile is domain specific (i.e. inter organizational 
cooperation) in this study, I do not expect to see a great influence for the normative and 
cognitive pillars of collaboration on the availability of resources in a country. Therefore, 
the mediation effect will be restricted to the regulative pillar of the institutional profile.  
	
	 : The effect of the regulative pillar of a country on the network 
structures of its biomedical industry will be partially mediated by the 
availability of strategic resources in that country.  
	
	 . The effect of the regulative pillar of a country on the network 
structures of its biomedical industry will be partially mediated by the 
availability of knowledge resources in that country.  
	
	 . The effect of the regulative pillar of a country on the network 
structures of its biomedical industry will be partially mediated by the availability 
of technological resources in that country.  
	
	 . The effect of the regulative pillar of a country on the network 
structures of its biomedical industry will be partially mediated by the availability 







Before executing the actual study, a pilot study was conducted to test the research 
design and various aspect of the research methodology for the proposed model. Another 
purpose of the pilot study was to find out more about the validity of measures for each 
variable as well as if there is a cross country variation among the networks of the 
biomedical industry, which can support the first research question. 
The network data for the pilot study was collected from the SDC Platinum 
database, which lists all joint ventures and strategic alliances worldwide for many sectors 
that include many biotechnology industries. The network in the pilot study included the 
alliances between biomedical firms in 38 countries during the period of 2005 2007 (three 
years). Constructing the network for a timeframe of three years is a common practice in 
inter organizational network research (e.g. Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  
After establishing the global network, it turned out that some countries were 
represented by just one or two firms (e.g. Brazil, UAE, and South Africa); which means 
that there is no real network of the biomedical industry in these countries. We, therefore, 
excluded these countries from the final dataset. USA is also excluded because there is a 
high coverage for firms from US which posts a problem of bias toward US firms’ 
characteristics. After excluding the countries with low coverage and USA, we ended up 
with 15 countries. These countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, India, Italy, 
Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and UK. The network measure was calculated for 554 firms from these 15 countries. 

















The dependent variable in the pilot study is network structure, more specifically 
global network density. To calculate structural measures, symmetric (non directional) 
matrix was constructed (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The measures then calculated by 
using the UCINET software (Borgatti et al., 2002). First, the global networks of the 
biomedical industry were constructed and then by using the extracting command in the 
software, the network for each country was isolated. The individual network for each 
country was used to calculate the network density of that country.  
Two different measures of network density were used in the pilot and actual 
studies because of the significant difference between their sample sizes. In the pilot 
study, the density is a country level measure that indicates the density of the overall 
biomedical network in a country. This density is measured by the number of actual ties 
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between all organizations in an industry divided by the number of possible ties in a 
network (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Shipilov, 2006). In the actual study, however, the 
density is a firm level variable, which measures the density of the ego network of each 
firm in a country.  
In the pilot study, the original attempt was to use the ego network density; 
however, after collecting the data and obtaining the ego network measures, we calculated 
the intra class correlation of the unconditional HLM model. The ICC was just .03 which 
means that only 3% of the ego density variation resides between countries. ICC of just 
.03 is too low and does not justify the use of HLM (Bliese, 2000). As a consequence, the 
decision was to use the global network density instead of ego density to execute the pilot 
study.       
The differences in the dependent variables between the pilot and actual studies 
forced us to change the modeling techniques. Since all the variables in the pilot study are 
at the country level, using multiple regression analysis was the proper method to test the 
hypotheses. On the other hand, since there are two levels of analysis in the actual study 
(country and firm levels), Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) was used to test for the 
hypotheses.  
The measures of independent and mediating variables are also different between 
the pilot and actual studies. In the former, the variables were measured by single item 
measures, while in the latter, multi item measures have been adopted. Since the exact 
measures have not been used previously in the literature, the choice of items in the pilot 
study was based on finding the most relevant items that represent the variables in 
question. For instance, the regulative pillar is measured by the institutional strength in the 
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Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). This measure is a combination of 18 items that 
range from property right protection and efficiency of the legal framework to the strength 
of auditing and reporting standards. This measure in general evaluates the overall rigor of 
the regulative institutions in a country. Xu et al. (2004) use this measure as a component 
of their regulative pillar variable.   
The normative pillar was measured by the ratio between the alliance cases and the 
acquisition cases in a country. This measure is also used in the actual study as a 
component to construct the normative pillar. The rationale behind this measure is that the 
higher this ratio in a country, the more the norms of cooperation in that country. The 
number of alliances and acquisitions were obtained from the SDC database. This measure 
is on the country level; therefore, it included the number of acquisitions and alliances for 
all industries and not just for the biomedical.   
The cognitive pillar is measuring the social knowledge shared by the people in a 
given country regarding the cooperative activities. This knowledge is represented by the 
collectivistic attitudes of individuals in the chosen countries. I used the Hofstede’s (2001) 
construct of individualism/collectivism as a measure of cognitive pillar. Parboteeah et al. 
(2008) use cultural dimensions from Hofstede (2001) in his measure of the country 
institutional profile.  
 The three mediator variables are i) availability of knowledge, ii) availability of 
technological resources, and iii) availability of financial resources. Availability of 
knowledge is measured by the item of “local availability of research and training 
services” in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). Availability of technological 
resources is measured by the item of “availability of latest technologies” in the GCR. 
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Availability of capital is measured by the item of “venture capital availability” in the 
GCR. As can be seen, the independent and mediating variables were each measured by a 
single item. To improve the validity of the measures in the actual study, I generated many 
items to construct each variable.   
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To test the hypotheses, the regression analysis has been used. Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 
provide full summary for all regression models that have been utilized in the analysis. 
The argument of hypothesis (1) is that the lower the score on the regulative pillar, the 
greater the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The result of the 
regression analysis in model (1) shows that there is a significant and negative relationship 
between the score of a country on the regulative pillar and its global network density. 
This result gives a good support for hypothesis (1).  
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Hypothesis (2) claims that the higher the score on the normative pillar, the more 
the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The regression of the 
network density on the score of a country on the normative pillar (model 2) indicates that 
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there is significant and positive relationship between the normative pillar and network 
density, which support hypothesis (2).  
Hypothesis (3) emphasizes that the higher the score on the cognitive pillar, the 
greater the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The cognitive 
pillar is measured by the individualism construct of Hofstede (2001), which means that 
the low score of individualism (high collectivism) will be accompanied by high network 
density. The result in model (3) shows that there is a significant and negative relationship 
between individualism and network density which supports hypothesis (3).  
Model (4) combines the three pillars together and the results hold for regulative 
and partially for the cognitive pillars but not for the normative pillar (not significant). In 
model (5), the normative pillar has been eliminated and the results are significant for the 
regulative and the cognitive pillars which provide more support for the hypotheses (1) 
and (3).  
Hypothesis (4) claims that the more knowledge is available within a country, the 
lower the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. Model (6) tests this 
hypothesis and the result show that there is negative and significant relationship between 
availability of knowledge resources and network density which gives strong support to 
hypothesis 4.  
Hypothesis (5) states that the more available the technological resources in a 
country, the lower the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The 
results of model (7) indicate significant and negative relationship between network 
density and availability of technological resources. These results support hypothesis (5)  
Hypothesis (6) indicates that the more available the financial resources in a 
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country, the lower the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The 
results of model (8) show that there is a negative and significant relationship between the 
availability of financial resources and network density, which support hypothesis (6).   
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To test that a variable (M) mediates the relationship between the independent 
variable (I) and the dependent variable (D), Baron and Kenny (1986) propose three step 
procedures. First, test the direct relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variable. Second, test for the relationship between the independent variable and the 
mediator. Finally, regress the dependent variable on the independent and mediator 
variables, and if all the relationships are significant, that means there is a partial 
mediation. If the significance of the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables disappeared, that means there is a full mediation.  
We have already tested the first step which is the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables and they were significant (models 1 & 5). Step 2 
can be tested by regressing the mediator variables on the independent variables. Models 
(9, 10, & 11) show the effect of the regulative pillar on the three mediators (availability 
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of financial, knowledge and technological resources). 
 The results of model (9) indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the score of the regulative pillar and the availability of financial 
resources. This is an interesting finding since it indicates that in countries with stronger 
and more rigorous legal system, we expect to see more availability of financial resources 
to economic actors.    
Model (10) indicates that the relationship between the regulative pillar and 
resource availability is positive and significant. We can explain this result by arguing that 
the strong regulative system in a country creates the foundation for crating and 
disseminating knowledge resources in that country.  
Model (11) shows the same results as those of models (9 & 10) which support the 
main argument of the three models: the stronger the regulative system, the more available 
the resources. The results of model (11) indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the regulative pillar and the availability of technological resources.         
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The last stage in testing the mediation effect is including the independent, 
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dependent and mediator variables in the same equation. Model (12) tests for the 
relationships between regulative pillar, availability of financial resources, and network 
density. The model indicates that all the relationships are significant which supports the 
partial mediation hypothesis. This result means that the regulative pillar is affecting 
network structure by two means. First, there is a direct influence of regulations on 
network structure. Second, there is an indirect influence through affecting the availability 
of financial resources which in turn affect the network structure. 
Model (13) tests for the relationship between regulative pillar, availability of 
knowledge, and network density. All the relationships are significant which support the 
partial mediation hypothesis. Again, the regulative pillar has both direct and indirect 
effect on network density by influencing the availability of knowledge resources in a 
country.  
Finally, Model 14 tests for the relationship between regulative pillar, availability 
of technology and network density. We can notice that the significance disappear for the 
relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable which means that the 
mediation effect is not supported in this case. This result indicates that there is no indirect 
effect between the regulative pillar and network density through the availability of 
technological resources.  
To summarize the results of the pilot study, we can say that two of the direct 
effect hypotheses (1 & 3) are strongly supported and there are strong relationships 
between regulative and cognitive pillars and the network density in a country. Hypothesis 
(2) that explains the relationship between the normative pillar and density of network is 
partially supported. Hypotheses (4, 5, and 6) that explain the relationship between 
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availability of financial, knowledge, and technological resources and network density  
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have been all supported. There are strong relationships between availability of resources 
and the network density of each country. Finally, the mediator effect of the availability of 
resources between the regulative pillar and network density has been supported for the 
financial and knowledge resources but not for the technological resources. Figure (3) 
provides a summary for the findings of the pilot study.  
 
..		%"	+!	0	(%	$"1		
The results of the pilot study awarded a strong support for the general model of the study. 
All the direct effect hypotheses were supported except one and the partial mediation 
effect is also supported. A variation in the network structure among countries has also 
been identified. The comparison between the scores of the global network density among 
the selected 15 countries shows that there is enough variation among countries to justify 
conducting the actual study. All of these results encouraged the committee members to 









The lack of variability in the ego network density that was experienced in the pilot 
study encouraged us to attempt to increase the network data (adding more ties to the 
network). The increase of ties has been achieved by increasing the timeframe of 
establishing the network from 3 years to 5 years. We also added another database 
(RECAP) which significantly increased the number of ties among biomedical firms. 
More specifically, the number of ties has increased from 554 to 2150 ties.  
In addition to the extension of the time frame and adding another database, we 
were able to add three more countries to the final sample for the actual study since the 
number of firms in these three countries passed the cut  off point of 10 firms per country 
(the cut off point is based on the HLM specifications). These three countries are 
Belgium, Malaysia, and Spain. Therefore, the number of countries in the actual study is 
































































Another outcome of the pilot study is using multi items to measure for the 
independent and mediating variables. The problems of multi collinearity and common 
method variance were evident in the pilot study; therefore, multi items measures have 
been adopted in the actual study to prevent these problems.  
Common method variance is the “variance that is attributable to the measurement 
method rather than to the constructs the measures represent” (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & 
Podsakoff, 2003: 879). Podsakoff et al. (2003) indicate that common method variance 
can arise from having a common rater, a common measurement context, a common item 
context, or from the characteristics of the items themselves. Since the majority of the 
variables in the pilot study (the regulative pillars in addition to the three resource 
availability variables) are measured by items from the Global Competitiveness Report, 
the results of the study are prone to common method bias because these items are 
completed by the same rater, under the same context.  
Podsakoff et al. (2003) propose a solution to this problem by arguing that 
researchers could obtain the measures of the predictor and mediating variables from 
different sources. Therefore, in the actual study, we introduced other sources beside GCR 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Value Survey to construct the 
independent and mediating variables.  
Table (6) summarized various aspects of the pilot study and the actual study. It 
shows how the pilot study helped to improve sampling, measures, and statistical analysis 
in order to have more reliable results in the actual study. It is clear that there are at least 7 
major differences between the pilot and actual studies. These major differences between 
the two studies (especially the dependent variables and number of ties) make it very hard 
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to interpret the differences in findings between the two studies. However, we can argue 
that the regulative pillar in addition to the availability of resources, in both studies, have 
significant relationships with network density (either global or ego). The combined 
findings of the two studies give more support to the main argument of this research which 
is networks vary among countries and the variation can be explained by both institutional 




Dependent variable  overall country network 
density  
Ego network density  
Independent and 
mediating variables  
Single item measures  Multi items measures  
Sources of regulative 
and mediating 
variables 
GCR  GCR, WBI, IMF, WVS, 
and Heritage Foundation.  
Databases of 
network measures 
SDC SDC and RECAP  
Time frame  Three years (2005 
2007) 
Five years (2005 2009) 
Number of countries  15 18 















 As it has been explained in the pilot study, the independent variables (pillars of 
countries’ institutional profiles) and meditating variables (availability of resources) 
should be obtained from different sources to eliminate the risk of common method 
variance and multi collinearity. Therefore, the dependent, independent, and mediating 
variables have been collected from different data sources. Moreover, following the advice 
of Podsakoff et al. (2003), the databases that have been used to obtain the dependent 
variable are totally different from those used to obtain the independent and mediating 
variables. All the data was obtained from secondary sources.   
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To collect network data (inter organizational relationships), two databases were 
used: SDC Platinum and Recombinant Capital (RECAP). SDC (Securities Data 
Corporation) platinum is a division of Thomson Reuters. It provides information about 
global new issues, M&A, syndicated loans, private equity, project finance, and more. 
Alliances data are under the merger & acquisition section of the database. SDC 
Platinum covers approximately 672,000 global M&As from 1985 to the present including 
many alliance agreements. SDC tracks a vast array of agreement types, including joint 
ventures, strategic alliances, research and development (R&D), sales and marketing, 
manufacturing, supply, and licensing and distribution agreements. Agreements data is not 
restricted to companies; it is also collected for research institutions, universities, 
government agencies, international agencies and many other entities.  
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In a recent review of the databases that are used in network studies, Schilling 
(2009) indicates that SDC has the widest range of sectors among industries and it has a 
wide international coverage. Many researchers have used SDC to collect alliances data 
(e.g. Lin et al., 2009; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Reuer & Ragoozzino, 2006; Rosenkopf et 
al., 2001; Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). According to Schilling (2009), SDC is a 
legitimate source for alliance data.       
Since there is no alliance database with complete or exhaustive coverage 
(Shilling, 2009) and, as explained in the pilot study, this research needs to have valid and 
comprehensive data about relationships between biomedical firms around the world, I 
decided to use another database, RECAP, in addition to SDC. Using multiple sources of 
network data is a common practice in network research (e.g. Rowley et al., 2000). 
RECAP is a specialized database for the biotechnology industry. It is a division of 
Deloitte and provides consulting services to the biotech industries.  
RECAP allows search by company names or by timeframe. It provides data about 
several types of agreements such as co development, R&D, co marketing, licensing, joint 
ventures, manufacturing, and distribution. This database provides information about 
different types of organizations that participate in the value chain of the biotechnology 
industries such as biomedical firms, pharmaceutical firms, universities, government 
agencies, and international agencies. RECAP has been used extensively to conduct 
various researches on alliances in the biotech industry (e.g. Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008; 
Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Santoro & McGill, 2005).  
A five year window, 2005 2009, has been used to construct the global network of 
the biomedical industry. There are various perspectives in the literature about the time 
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window that is required to construct the inter organizational networks. For instance, some 
researchers adopt a three year time window (e.g. Schilling & Phelps, 2007); others use 
the four year window (e.g. Bae & Gargiulo, 2004); finally, some have adopted the five 
year window (e.g. Baum et al., 2003; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). After a review of several 
alliances research, Gulati (1995) supports the choice of a five year window because he 
found that the lifespan for the majority of alliances is usually no more than five years. In 
addition to the previous reason, we found in the pilot study that for a three year window 
the variation of ego network density among countries was very small. Therefore, a five 
year window is adopted in the actual study to give a longer time for the countries’ 
networks and experience more variability.   
After collecting the required data from both databases, it was clear that the 
RECAP database has more coverage for the industry than SDC. To clarify that, I 
calculated the differences in reported alliances between firms for the three years: 2005, 
2006, and 2007. The overall number of alliances is 2614 out of which 82.25% (or 2150 
ties) have been reported exclusively in the RECAP and only 7.04% (or 184 ties) are 
reported exclusively in the SDC. The overlap between the two databases is just 10.72% 
(or 280 ties). Figure (4) provides an overview of the relationships between the findings of 
the two databases. My findings for the coverage of databases are consistent with the 
findings of Schilling (2009). She conducted a comparison between three databases (SDC, 
RECAP, and MERIT CATI), and found that RECAP performed the best, identifying an 
average of 22.2 % of the biotech alliances reported in SDC and MERIT CATI.  
Since coverage varies between databases, I used both RECAP and SDC databases 
to construct countries’ networks. Alliances that are included in both databases have been 
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used directly in constructing the networks. Alliances that are reported exclusively in 
either SDC or RECAP were subject to a validity test. Following Srivastava and Gnyawali 
(2011), I have used news reported on Factiva to trace alliances that are not reported in the 
both databases. I followed the systematic random sampling procedure in which every Kth 
element in the sampling frame is selected (Black, 2008) to be checked against the data 
available through sources other than the two databases of the study. More specifically,  
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I selected each 21st alliance to be checked by Factiva news or by direct on line sources 
(searching the name on the Google search engine). All alliances that are reported 
exclusively in one of the two databases have matched a news piece on either Factiva or 
some other news websites. The rate is 100% which means that the reliability of the 
reported alliances is very high, however, the problem is in the not reported alliances.     
The problem of the not reported alliances is more severe in countries where 
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English is not the first language. All the databases that deal with alliances have a bias 
toward English sources (Schilling, 2009). Jung Youn (2006) advocates that Korean firms 
should make more disclosures in English. He asserts that during the first eight months of 
2006, only 49 English disclosures have been made among which 35 were done by one 
firm (KT&G Corp, a tobacco manufacturer).  Therefore, I relied on my own search by 
using the native language for some countries in the language field on the Factiva search 
engine then using Google translation to translate the news into English. This method was 
especially used for some of the Asian countries such as China, South Korea, and 
Malaysia. However, it did not significantly improve the coverage for these countries (3 
alliances for China, 0 for South Korea, and 1 for Malaysia). More details are provided in 
appendix (A). The low improvement in coverage can be explained by arguing that the 
biomedical industry is a global one and usually alliances with big players demonstrate the 
competency of the biotech firms (Janney & Folta, 2003); therefore, firms try to disclose 
their alliances in English in order to show that they are legitimate partners among 
international players.   
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The three independent variables of this study are the three pillars of the 
institutional profile, namely regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Secondary 
sources of data will be used to calculate these measures. The practice of measuring 
institutional profile by secondary data has received increasing support in the literature. 
For instance, Xu, Pan and Beamish (2004) have used many variables from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) to measure the regulative and normative distances among 
different countries. Also Parboteeah et al. (2008) and Parboteeah et al. (2009) have used 
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the World Value Survey to measure a country’s institutional profile. Furthermore, Ang 
and Michailova (2008) have used the World Bank’s composite measure of governance 
and cultural scores to measure the institutional profile and then detect its influence on the 
adoption of equity alliance mode by firms from emerging countries.     
To eliminate common method variance and collinearity, I will use many different 
secondary sources to measure the institutional profile of a country for the domain of 
inter organizational network. The GCR is published annually by the Geneva based World 
Economic Forum.  Increasing number of studies have used this source of data (Delios & 
Beamish, 1999; Wan & Hoskisson 2003;  Xu , Pan & Beamish, 2004).  
The World Value Survey (WVS) is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and 
political change. It is conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities 
all around the world. Interviews have been carried out with nationally representative 
samples of the population of more than 80 societies on all six inhabited continents. The 
data is collected by either survey questionnaires or direct interviews questionnaires 
(World Values Study Group, 2000). I will be using the results of the 2005 2008 waves 
because they better fit with the timeframe of my study.   
Following Meyer et al. (2009) and Gubbi et al. (2010), I proxy the regulative 
pillar of every country’s institutional profile by the compound index of economic 
freedom. The index is developed by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. 
The index covers 10 freedom factors, from property rights to entrepreneurship, in 183 
countries. I will use the data for year 2005, as the starting year of the timeframe of my 




The GLOBE study will also be used as a source for four items in the normative 
and cognitive pillars. The GLOBE study (House et al., 2004) was conducted in the mid 
1990s and involved more than 170 investigators in 62 countries or regions. The study 
aims to test various hypotheses that had been developed, in particular, on leadership 
topics. Survey questionnaires were developed and collected from more than 17,000 
middle managers in 951 organizations. The GLOBE study is widely used in international 
business and cross cultural studies (e.g. Parboteeah et al., 2008; Tung, 2008).  
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 The moderating variables represent the availability of resources (i.e. availability 
of knowledge, technological, and financial resources). In addition to the Global 
Competitiveness Report, I will use the World Bank Indicators, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the US Patent and Trademark Office databases for these variables. The World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank include data from 209 countries 
spanning from 1960 to 2010. The World Bank indicators are widely used in international 
business (e.g. Berry et al., 2010; Cuervo cazurra, 2008; Kali & Reyes, 2007).  
For the financial availability variable, I will consider indictors from the 
International Monetary Fund. The IMF publishes a range of time series data on IMF 
lending, exchange rates and other economic and financial indicators covering more than 
200 countries around the world (IMF, 2011).  Researchers rely heavily on IMF measures 
for differences among countries regarding their financial outcomes (e.g. Kali & Reyes, 
2007).  
Finally, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database is also used for 
moderating variables. The USPTO is an agency in the United States Department of 
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Commerce issuing patents to inventors and businesses for their inventions 
and trademark registration for products and intellectual property identifications. USPTO 
gives the total number of patents granted to the top innovator of each country. Patent 
numbers from the USPTO are commonly used to differentiate between innovative 
outcomes of countries (e.g. Allred & Park, 2007; Berry et al., 2010; Lederman, 2010). 
Appendix (B) summarizes the different items that will be used in measuring the 




Since this study attempts to compare the network structure between many 
countries, we need to control for the industry effect. Rosenkopf and Shcilling (2007) 
compared the network structure of various industries. They found that different industries 
show varying network structures. Therefore, it is unreasonable to conduct the comparison 
between countries for many different industries because it will be very difficult to isolate 
the country and industry effects. Consequently, the comparison among countries will be 
only for the biomedical industry as the focused industry of this study. The choice of the 
industry was based on many factors especially its reliance on alliances (Powell et al., 
1996). Many network studies have used biomedical as the focal industry (e.g. Barley et 
al., 1992; Baum et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Oliver, 2001; Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2004). 
Biomedical research industry is a branch of the biotechnology industry. 
 The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity defines biotechnology as “Any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives 
thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use” (CBD, 2011). The 
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biomedical industry is comprised of all the evaluation and development of new 
treatments in the medical field. This industry includes different types of firms that can be 
grouped in four categories: biotechnology firms, pharmaceuticals, test labs, and research 
institutes.  
The biomedical firms follow business models that rely heavily on scientific and 
emerging specialized knowledge; therefore, they are under pressure to partner with non 
profit organizations, such as government agencies and universities as well as 
pharmaceutical and chemical firms (Amburgey, Al Laham, Tzabbar & Aharonson, 
2008). The purpose of these partnerships is to have access to knowledge (Powell et al., 
1996) capital (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008) and commercial expertise (Amburgey et al., 
2008). Powell and Smith Doerr emphasize this point by stating that “[t]he dynamics of 
cooperation are endogenous to high technology fields where intellectual advances fuel 
new capabilities, which in turn require novel forms of collaboration” (1994: 388). The 
specific conditions of the industry encourage firms to perform more partnerships and 
alliances, creating visible inter organizational networks that are comparable among 
countries.   
In order to construct the network of the biomedical industry in each country, I 
started to code any relational agreements between firms from any country in the world 
during the five years from 2005 2009. I also coded the country of origin for each partner. 
There are two criteria to design the network of an industry in each country: i) 
membership in the target population (industry), and ii) at least one strategic alliance with 
another member of that industry (Bae & Garguilo, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000). The 
second condition is already achieved because I constructed the list of the biomedical 
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firms in each country from the alliances data of the biomedical firms. To ensure that all 
firms in my network satisfy the first condition, I manually checked if each firm included 
in the final dataset belongs to the value chain of the biomedical industry. To achieve that, 
I have consulted the firms’ websites and looked into the field of operation or the products 
of the company. I also used the website of the Bloomberg Businessweek magazine to find 
more information about firms. The Businessweek's website provides a quick summary of 
many international firms working in the biomedical industry. The website usually 
presents the main information about firms including their fields of operation, the dates of 
establishment, and the dates of defunct, if applicable. I have also consulted the 
MediLexicon1 directory of pharmaceutical and biomedical companies to ensure that firms 
used to construct the network are members in the biomedical value chain. For Canadian 
biomedical firms, I used the D&B (Dunn & Bradstreet) Million Dollar Database (MDDI) 
to check for a list of these firms.   
In the final dataset, I included biotechnology firms that are specialized in medical 
research, pharmaceuticals, test labs, and research institutes. Many firms that are included 
in the original SDC and RECAP databases belong to the biotechnology industry, but they 
do not perform medical related activities (for instance, many of them perform agricultural 
related activities such as ABPL India and Monsanto of USA). Therefore, all 
biotechnology firms that do not perform medical related activities were not included in 
constructing the biomedical network in each country.   
The final dataset includes alliances data for 2666 firms around the world. These 
firms belong to 45 countries that span the six continents. The network in some countries 
                                                 
1  MediLexicon is a UK based on line data source that provides medical and pharmaceutical 
directories, among other things. It can be accessed at http://www.medilexicon.com/ 
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consists of just two or three firms, which makes any study about network structure in 
such countries meaningless. A total of 26 countries were excluded since there is no 
meaningful network within their biomedical industry. In other words, those networks that 
have less than 10 firms and have no relationship between the member firms were 
excluded. Since Hierarchical Linear Modeling is used to analyze the collected data and 
10 is the minimum number of members within each group that can yield meaningful 
results (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997), I excluded countries with networks 
of less than 10 firms from the dataset.  I also excluded the US from the final dataset 
because keeping it will skew the results toward the characteristics of the US market. 
Schilling (2009) indicates that databases have a bias toward covering data about US 
firms. Also, the US naturally has the highest number of biomedical firms in the world 
(1259 firms), which constitute 47.22% of the global number of firms. It is also 
unreasonable to compare the structure of an 18 firm network like the case of Singapore 
with the 1259 firm network of the US.        
The final dataset includes 18 countries that can be grouped into two distinctive 
sets, emerging and developed countries. There are 13 developed countries and they are 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The five emerging countries are China, 
India, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. The total number of firms in these 18 
countries is 1391. Table (7) provides a breakdown for the number of firms in each 




















Malaysia  18 
Netherlands 66 
Singapore 19 




United Kingdom 203 




The model of this study includes one dependent variable (ego network density), 
three independent variables (regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions), and three 
mediating variables (availability of financial, knowledge, and technological resources). 
 
/.	("	#2%		
The dependent variable in this study is the ego network density, which can be 
measured by the number of ties for each ego firm divided by the number of pairs for this 
firm, times 100 (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The density of the network is used to 
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operationalize the construct of network closure (e.g. Soda et al., 2004). This variable 
gives us an indication about the degree to which firms within the network maintain 
extensive ties among each other. Density can be calculated at the firm level by measuring 
the density of the focal firm’s network. It can also be calculated at the industry level by 
measuring the overall density of the industry.  
We choose to use ego network rather than global measure of density for many 
reasons. First, the theories underlying the hypotheses are more closely connected to ego 
networks than to global density. It has been argued that the behavior of firms is more 
influenced by the structure of ties among its direct partners and the global density is less 
influential on firm behavior (Garcia Pont & Nohria, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000). Since it 
is argued that organizations exercise strategic choice within restrictions imposed by their 
institutional environments, it is needed to see if each individual firm tries to build its 
alliances strategically under the different institutional environments and availability of 
resources, which can be achieved by studying ego network structure.  
The second reason for using ego rather than global density is that we are 
measuring the density as an opposite pole of structural holes. Since structural holes are 
presented in the literature as ego network measures (Borgatti, 2001), we need to adopt 
ego network density. Finally, relying on global network density will force us to use 
multiple regression analysis which is not appropriate for a very small sample size (n=18 
because each of the 18 countries will have just one figure for density). 
An ego network includes the collection of the focal actor (the biomedical firm in 
this research) and all nodes to which ego has a connection at one step path length 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). In this study, the “neighborhood” includes only ego and 
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actors that are directly adjacent, and all of the ties among all of the actors to whom ego 
has a direct connection (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
UCINET software (Borgatti et al., 2002) is used to calculate the dependent 
variable. UCINET is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social networks and 
other proximity data. The program contains many network analytic routines (e.g. 
centrality measures, dyadic cohesion measures, etc.), in addition to general statistical and 
multivariate analysis tools such as multidimensional scaling, factor analysis, cluster 
analysis, multiple regression, etc. UCINET is widely used for social network analysis in 
management research (e.g. Baum et al., 2003; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Zaheer & Bell, 
2005).    
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As explained in the theoretical development, the institutional profiles that will be 
measured are domain specific and the domain is the inter organizational relationships. 
The institutional profile consists of three pillars: regulative, normative and cognitive 
(Scott, 2005). Table (8) provides a summary of the items that have been used to measure 
these pillars of each country’s institutional profile.  
In the institutional profile literature, there is no identification for the domain of 
inter organizational relationships. Therefore, to identify the components of each pillar, it 
is necessary to follow Kostova’s (1999) assertion of identifying the specific regulative, 
normative, and cognitive elements that are relevant to the particular phenomenon of 
study, inter organizational relationships in this research.  
In their development for the institutional profile of gender equality, Parboteeah et 





Latent variable 	 Observed variables 	 Source  
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#	
(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1. Index of economic freedom*  
 
Heritage Foundation 




2. Ratio of acquisition to alliances in a country*  
3. Extent of market dominance*  
4.
 Intensity of local competition  
5.
 University industry research collaboration   
6.
 State of cluster development 
7.
 Collectivism institutional                                       
8. Collectivism in1group* 
 
                          SDC    
   GCR       
                         GCR 
                         GCR        
                         GCR        
GLOBE     




 Collectivism institutional value  
10.
Collectivism in group values  
11.Trust*  
12.Important in life: friends* 
13.






Items selected to measure the variables*  
 
institutional factors that influence this gender equality. For the cognitive pillar they 
considered two factors (educational system and level of religiosity). For the normative 
pillar they used many cultural dimensions including power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. Finally, for the 
regulative pillar, they emphasized five government policies regarding gender equality. 
Following the steps of Parboteeah et al. (2008), I reviewed the literature about the 
factors that affect inter organizational relationships, which is presented in the theoretical 
framing of the hypotheses. Then I searched the literature to find reliable measures for 
these factors. The literature was helpful in identifying the measure of the regulative pillar, 
but since the domain of the inter organizational relationships has not previously studied, I 
had to rely on measures that match the theoretical identifications of each pillar. The 




4.3.2.1. The regulative pillar 
The regulative pillar is measured by the Index of Economic Freedom developed 
by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. The index consists of ten 
components of economic freedom. It assigns a grade to each component using a scale 
from 0 to 100, where 100 represent the maximum freedom. The ten component scores are 
then averaged to give an overall economic freedom score for each country. The ten 
components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal 
Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial 
Freedom, Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption, and Labor freedom. 
The index fits with the previously explained conceptualization of the regulative 
pillar because it emphasizes the extent of government intervention and the state of 
property right protection in each country. Moreover, some researchers relied exclusively 
on the compound index of economic freedom to proxy the regulative pillar of the country 
institutional profile (e.g. Gubbi et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2009).  
Figure (5) presents the score on the regulative pillar of selected countries. It can 
be shown from the figure that the scores of countries range from around 50 up to almost 
90 out of 100. The distribution of countries does not totally confirm the classification of 
developed vs. emerging country. Although the majority of the developed countries have 
scores that are above 60 while the emerging countries have scores that are between 50 
and 60, there are notable exceptions for this classification such as the low score for 







4.3.2.2. The Normative Pillar 
The choice of items that construct the normative measure will be based on the 
conceptualization of this pillar in the literature. Normative elements are represented by 
values and norms held by individuals (Kostova, 1999; Scott, 2005) regarding the studied 
phenomenon. Therefore, normative pillar should measure the norms in the country 
toward cooperation vs. competition. If the norms of cooperation prevail, we expect to see 
denser networks in that country because people will use cooperation as a means to obtain 
resources. On the other hand, if the norms of competition are stronger, firms will perform 
more acquisitions than alliances to obtain required resources which bring down the 
density of networks. Seven items were subject to factor analysis to determine the measure 
of the normative pillar.  
The seven items have been chosen because they cover different dimensions of the 
normative pillar as developed in the theoretical explanation of the pillar. In brief, the ratio 
of acquisition to alliances gives an indication about the norms of alliances vs. the norms 
of acquisition. The state of cluster development item also gives an indication about the 
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prevalence of collaboration through organizational clusters. Two items, the extent of 
market dominance and the intensity of local competition, are included to measure the 
level of competition in the country. The item of university industry research collaboration 
is used to measure the norms of cooperation between universities and industries in a 
country. Finally, the two items of culture have been considered to be in the normative 
pillar because they measure the effect of practiced cultural norms on collaboration in a 
country. Following are details of each one of these seven items identified for measuring 
the normative pillar.       
The first item in the normative pillar is the ratio between the alliance cases and 
the acquisition cases in a country. This ratio gives us a clear view of whether companies 
in a certain country prefer to expand by collaborating with other firms and establishing 
alliances or to expand by acquisition. The higher this ratio, the more the norms of 
cooperation prevail in that country. The number of alliances and acquisitions is obtained 
from the SDC database. This measure is at the country level; therefore, it will include the 
number of acquisitions and alliances for all industries and not just the biomedical.   
The second item is the Extent of Market Dominance from the Global 
Competitiveness Report. This item is measured by asking respondents how they 
characterize corporate activity in their country (1 = dominated by a few business groups; 
7 = spread among many firms). The final score is the weighted average of the responses. 
Countries that have a low score on this item tend to have more collaboration within its 
business groups while countries that have a high score tend to have more dispersed 
relationships between firms because the role of the market facilitates the economic 
activities in these countries.  This item is reverse coded so that it fits with the direction of 
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the other items (high score means high norms of collaboration).   
The third item will also be adopted from the GCR. This item is the “Intensity of 
local competition.” Respondents are asked to rate if competition in the local market is 
high or low (1 = limited in most industries, 7 = intense in most industries). A high score 
on that measure for a country means that high competition is the norm in most industries 
in that country. This item was subject to reverse coding so low number reflects high 
competition in a country because, as it has been discussed before, acquisition prevail over 
collaboration in high competitive environments. I include this item because it shows how 
competition is valued in a specific country. 
The fourth item measures the level of “university industry research collaboration” 
from the GCR. Respondents are asked to answer this question: “In the area of R&D, 
collaboration between the business community and local universities is (1 = minimal or 
nonexistent, 7 = intensive and ongoing). This measure indicates that there are norms of 
collaboration between universities and industries’ actors, specifically, in the R&D 
activities. That means norms of collaboration have strength in countries that score high 
on this item.  
The fifth item measures the “state of cluster development” from the GCR. 
Respondents are asked to answer this question:  “In your country’s economy, well 
developed and deep clusters are (1 = rare or absent, 7 = widespread in many fields).” This 
item indicates that the norms of business in a country is more centralized around 
clustering and collaboration between firms than around isolated firms with less 
collaboration.  
Culture has been used in the literature empirically and conceptually as a 
109 
 
component for either the normative (Parboteeah et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2004) or the 
cognitive pillar (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). I will use culture as a 
component for the normative and cognitive measure. For the normative pillar, I will use 
the scores of the “institutional” and “in group” collectivism (As Is) as reported in the 
GLOBE study. These items measure the actual practice of collectivism, which represents 
the norm of collaboration. On the other hand, I will use the scores of valued collectivism 
(Should Be) in the cognitive pillar because it is closer to the knowledge of collaboration 
than to practice. 
The sixth item is adopted from the GLOBE study and it measures the practiced 
institutional collectivism. This measure is constructed by four questions that focus on the 
degree to which institutional practice at the societal level encourage and reward 
collectivistic actions (Gelfand et al., 2004). The questions assessed “whether group 
loyalty is emphasized at the expense of individual goals, whether the economic system 
emphasizes individual or collective interests, whether being accepted by other group 
members is important, and whether individualism or group cohesion is valued more in the 
society” (Gelfand et al., 2004: 463). To be differentiated from the (Should be) version, 
this statement is referred to as the (As Is) version of the scale: “in this society, people are 
in general . . .” Study participants responded to the question on a 7 point scale in which 1 
indicates low collectivism (or high individualism) and 7 indicates high collectivism (or 
low individualism).  
Finally, the seventh item is also adopted from the GLOBE study and it measures 
the in group collectivism. This item measures how individuals express pride, loyalty, and 
interdependence on their families (Gelfand et al., 2004). Even though the measure itself 
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does not have a direct relationship with organizational collaboration, I decided to include 
it. Thus I do not exclude any collectivism measure from the GLOBE study. This item is 
constructed by four questions of “whether children take pride in the individual 
accomplishments of their parents and vice versa, whether aging parents live at home with 
their children, and whether children live at home with their parents until they get 
married” (Gelfand et al., 2004: 463).  
Principle component analysis is very effective in capturing the highest amount of 
information from the data while reducing the dimensions of the measure (Lattin, Caroll, 
& Green, 2003). The factor analysis yields a three item measure (ratio of acquisition to 
alliances, extent of market dominance, and in group collectivism) with eigenvalue of 
2.25. All the items have higher loading than .80, and 75.25% of the variance is explained 
by this factor.  Table (10) provides the loading factors of these items.  
Figure (6) presents the scores on the normative pillar of selected countries. Since 
the normative pillar is a combination of different factors, the total score for this pillar is 
standardized and centralized. We can see that many countries have way above the mean 
scores such as China and India which is consistent with the perception that firms in these 
two countries are relying heavily on cooperation rather than competition.  
Since the corporatist countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Japan prefer 
cooperation over competition (Spencer, 2005), we expect to have high scores on the 
normative pillar of these countries. However, these countries have low scores on this 
pillar. On the other hand, the scores of the pluralist countries such as Australia, UK and 








4.3.2.3. The cognitive pillar  
This pillar will measure the social knowledge shared by people in a given country 
(Kostova, 1999; Scott, 2005) regarding the cooperative activities of various entities 
(individuals or firms) in that country. This knowledge will be represented by many 
factors including culture, trust, and importance of relationships and friendships. 
As mentioned before, the collectivistic items of cognitive pillar will be the 
(Should Be) variables of institutional and in group collectivism. These two variables are 
measured by the same eight questions that are used to measure the (As Is) variables, the 
only difference being that these questions are introduced by this statement: “In this 
society, people should . . .”  
Trust will be measured by an item that is adopted from the World Value Survey. 
Respondents were asked to answer this question: “generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
The possible answers are 1) most people can be trusted and 2) can’t, need to be very 
careful. Then the percentage of people who answered the first choice has been presented 
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for each country.    
Another measure of trust will be the perception of individuals, whether the others 
tend to take advantage of him/her. The question is: “do you think most people would try 
to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” the scale will 
be that 1) would take advantage and 10) try to be fair. Therefore, I consider that countries 
that have a high score on this item enjoy high level of trust between individuals.     
The last item in the cognitive pillar measures the importance of relationships in 
life especially friends. In the WVS, respondents were asked to answer this question: “for 
each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it 
is: Friends” the scale is (1: very important  4: not important at all). I use the percentage of 
respondents who answered that friends are very important.           
The factor analysis yields a three item measure (trust, people take advantage of 
you, and importance of friendship) with eigenvalue of 2.442. The loading factors for all 
the items are higher than .70, and 61.04% of the variance is explained by this factor.  
Table (10) presents the detailed loadings.  
Figure (7) presents the scores on the cognitive pillar of selected countries. Similar 
to the process of calculating countries’ scores on the normative pillar, the cognitive pillar 
scores are standardized and centralized. We can notice that Sweden and Denmark have 
the highest scores; consequently, we can claim that the norms of trust prevail in these 
countries. The low score of India is little surprising because we expect that people in 
India rely on their friendships and social relationships which increase their trust while the 
score of India implies the opposite. By investigating the scores of India on the items that 







 “People try to take advantage of you” item, which explains the low score of India on the 




There are three variables that mediate the relationship between the regulative 
pillar and the network density. The three mediators are availability of knowledge, 
availability of technology, and availability of financial resources. It has been discussed 
before that the theoretical rationale is the only basis for advancing a particular causal 
order in non experimental studies (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006) which is the case for this 
study. Since the institutional profile is domain specific (i.e. inter organizational 
cooperation) in this study, there is no theoretical justification in the literature to connect 
the norms and knowledge of collaboration among firms in a country and the availability 
of resources in that country. Therefore, the mediation effect will be restricted to the 
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regulative pillar of the institutional profile. 
To generate the items that construct the mediating variables, extensive literature 
review on country level measures was performed. All the data sources that are utilized in 
this research have already been used in the literature; however, the exact items might not 
be used since specific type of resource availability is of concern. The 21 reported items in 
table (9) is an exhaustive list of items related to the types of resources that I used in this 
research. These 21 items were then subject to factor analysis to determine the measures 
for each variable.  
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1.Quality of educational system*  
2.
Local availability of research & training  
3.
Capacity for innovation  
4.
Availability of scientists and engineers  
5.
Quality of scientific research institutions  
6.
Patent per capita  
7.# of Scientific and technical journal 
articles* 
8.
Researchers in R&D 
9.















10.Availability of latest technologies*  
11.Firm1level technology absorption* 
12.Production process sophistication*  
13.









Domestic credit provided by banking 
sector* 
15.
Financial market sophistication  
16.
Financing through local equity market  
17.
Ease of access to loan  
18.
Venture capital availability  
19.
Restriction on capital flow  
20.
Soundness of banks 
21.
Outstanding loans from commercial 
banks*  
 









Items selected to measure the mediating variables*  
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4.3.3.1 Availability of knowledge resource 
This variable assesses the availability of knowledge in each of the studied 
countries. Many items can be associated with high knowledge availability in a country 
such as a high quality of education system. Furthermore, knowledge availability can be 
fostered by availability of more scientific institutions that can execute R&D activities and 
nurture the development of new patents and innovations. Human capital such as scientists 
and engineers who can conduct research play major role in increasing knowledge 
availability. Finally, scientific publications have a significant role in disseminating of 
knowledge. 
In total, nine items have been collected from various sources indicating that 
certain countries have more available knowledge than others. After a factor analysis test, 
these items are grouped in two factors. The first one is based on items from GCR and the 
other factor included items from GCR and the World Bank Indicators (items 1 and 7). 
The second factor was selected to avoid a high correlation that the first factor has with the 
availability of technology variable. The correlation of the first factor with the availability 
of technology was .94, and the correlation was significant at .01 level using the GCR 
based items. Under this condition of high correlation, it is hard to differentiate between 
the effect of availability of knowledge and availability of technology. The variance 
explained by chosen second factor is 77.6% and the loading factors are higher than 0.8 
(table, 10). 
The first item included in the availability of knowledge variable is “quality of 
educational system” which is adopted from the GCR. Respondents were asked to answer 
this question: “The educational system in your country (1 = does not meet the needs of a 
116 
 
competitive economy, 7 = meets the needs of a competitive economy).” Countries that 
score high on this item tend to have better educational systems and, consequently, 
knowledge will be more available to be used by various economic actors.  
The second item that indicates the availability of knowledge is the number of 
scientific and technical journal articles that are published by scholars in a specific 
country. This item is adopted from the World Bank Indicators and it includes scientific 
and technical journal articles published in the following fields: physics, biology, 
chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and 
technology, and earth and space sciences. Clearly, knowledge should be available in a 
country so that scholars in that country will be able to publish scientific and technical 
articles.  
Figure (8) presents the scores for the availability of knowledge resources of the 
selected countries. Some countries have expected high score on this variable such as 






score such as China and India. Surprisingly, Germany, Japan, and UK ended up with low 
scores on this measure, particularly, as a result of their low score on the quality of their 
educational systems. 
 
4.3.3.2. The availability of technological resources 
This variable measures whether new technologies are readily available for firms 
in each country. Four items were subject to factor analysis and one factor has emerged 
with eigenvalue of 2.65 which explains 86.7% of the variance. As shown in table (10) 
items 10, 11, and 12 have high loading on this factor. 
The first item that has high loadings is “Availability of latest technology” which 
is adopted from the GCR.   The question of this item is: “In your country, the latest 
technologies are (1 = not widely available or used, 7 = widely available and used).” 
Countries that have high score on this item will have latest technologies available in their 
local environment.  
The second item is “Firm level technology absorption”. This variable indicates 
that not only technology is available but it also has been used properly by local firms. 
Respondents were asked to answer this question: “Companies in your country are (1 = 
not able to absorb new technology, 7 = aggressive in absorbing new technology).” 
The final item for technological availability measure is the “Production process 
sophistication.” “In your country, production processes use (1 = labor intensive methods 
or previous generations of process technology, 7 = the world’s best and most efficient 
process technology).” Clearly, this item measures whether firms use new technologies or 
outdated ones with high scores for using new technologies. The source of this item is also 
the GCR.  
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Figure (9) presents the scores on the availability of technology resources for the 
selected countries. The scores of countries are somewhat predictable with some countries 
have really high scores such as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, and Japan. On the other 
hand, China, India, and Malaysia have low scores on this measure. The low scores for 
Italy and Spain is somewhat odd, but by examining the scores of these two countries on 




has low scores on two items (the availability of latest technologies and firms level 
technology absorption) while Spain has a low score on the third item (production process 
sophistication).      
4.3.3.3. The availability of financial resources 
This variable measures the easiness of getting access to capital and the amount of 
capital available for economic activities within a country. In the literature, many variables 
have been used to measure the status of financial capital availability. I collected eight 
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such items from various sources (presented in table 3). The factor analysis for these eight 
items resulted in two strong factors with high eigenvalues. The first factor consists 
mainly of the items from the Global Competitiveness Report. The other factor consists of 
items 14 and 21. I choose to use the second factor because the first factor has high 
correlation with other types of resources (knowledge and technology) which can cause 
the problem of multicollinearity between the mediating variables. The correlation of the 
first factor with the availability of technology was 0.74 and it was 0.61 with the 
availability of knowledge. The correlations were significant at .01 level when I used the 
GCR based items; therefore, the second factor has been chosen to represent the 
availability of financial resources.   
Two items have high loading on the second chosen factor; 1) domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector, and 2) outstanding loans from commercial banks. This 
factor explains 65.72% of the variance and its loading is above 0.8 (table 10). The first 
item is a World Bank Indicator, which includes all the credits to various sectors on a 
gross basis, with the exception of the credits to the central governments, which are net 
values. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, in 
addition to other banking institutions. The second item is adopted from the IMF, which 
represents the outstanding loans from commercial banks based on percentage of GDP. 
The score is calculated by using this equation: (Outstanding loan)* 100/GDP. 
Figure (10) presents the scores on the availability of financial resources for selected 
countries. The distribution of scores is relatively predictable with some countries showing 
high scores such as Switzerland, UK, Japan, and Netherland. On other hand, other 







unexpected results are the low score of France and Germany. That could be explained by 
the tight control of the financial systems in both countries.  
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Normative 
pillar 75.25% 
Ratio of alliances/acquisition .867 
Extent of market dominance .814 
In group collectivism (practice) .918 
Cognitive 
pillar 61.04% 
Most people can be trusted .700 
People try to take advantage of you .851 
Important in life: friends .827 
Knowledge 
availability 77.60% 
Quality of educational system .881 




Availability of latest technologies .961 
Firms level technology absorption .902 
Production process sophistication .930 
Financial 
availability 65.72% 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector .811 




This study is concerned with the variance in industry level network structures that 
is explained by a number of country level predictors. Therefore, it mandates a multilevel 
modeling technique in which the variances can be partitioned between the country level 
and the industry level variables. A variety of statistical procedures are available to 
analyze multilevel data such as Within and Between Analysis (WABA), Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM), Cross Level Operator (CLOP) analyses in regression, and 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) (Klein et al., 2000).  
Many authors suggest that the use of traditional statistical techniques in cross 
level studies may prove inadequate (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hoegl et al., 2002; 
Rousseau, 1985). Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) allows the estimation of random 
and fixed effects while Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression includes only fixed 
effect (Beretvas, 2007). Moreover, HLM overcomes many problems intrinsic to 
regression methods of dealing with cross level issues such as unit of analysis problems 
(Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002).  
In this study we are trying to find out if there is a between country variation in 
their network structure at firm level and explain this variance by variables at country 
level. Since (HLM) captures “the influence of higher level units on lower level outcomes 
while maintaining the appropriate level of analysis” (Hofmann, 1997: 726), I am using 
HLM in this study. With HLM, we can test hypotheses between the two levels of 
analyses and partition the explained variances at each level (Hoegl et al., 2002).   
In order to model both within level (in each country) and between level 
relationships (among countries), we need to estimate two models: 1) the level 1 model 
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which, in this case, estimates the variance of density among each of the level 1 units (the 
biomedical firms), and 2) the level 2 model which explains how variation among level 1 
units is explained by level 2 variables (among countries) (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).    
 
Level 1 Model 
 
Yij = β0j + rij                                                                                   (1)         
  
 Where Yij is the density of firm i in country j, β0j is the intercept estimated for 
each country, and rij is the residual (the residual is normally distributed with a variance of 
σ2). The level 2 analysis uses the intercept from the level 1 analysis as dependent 
variables (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).  The intercept and slop parameters obtained from 
the level 1 model serve as the dependent variables in the level 2 model (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992) 
 
Level 2 Model   
 β0j = γ00 + γ01 * (Xi) + u0j                                                                    (2) 
 
Where Xi   is the country level variables (pillars of the institutional profile and the 
resource availability variables), γ00 is the second stage intercept term, γ01 is the slope 
relating Xi to the intercept term from the level 1 equation, and u0j is the level 2 residual 
(Hofmann, 1997).   
 To justify the use of the HLM, we need to estimate the partitioning of the 
variability at each level (Beretvas, 2007). The unconditional model (including no 
predictors) is used to estimate the partitioning of variability at level 1 and level 2 
(Hofmann, 1997). The unconditional model can estimate the variability of network 
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density among firms and the variability of density among countries.  
 At level 1, DENSITY (the independent variable) for firm i in the country j is 
modeled only as a function of country j's intercept and the firm's residual (Beretvas, 
2007). 
Level 1 unconditional model 
DENSITYij = β0j + rij                                                        (3) 
 
 At level 2, country j's intercept is modeled to be a function of the average 
intercept (DENSITY score) across countries and a country residual (Beretvas, 2007). 
 
Level 2 unconditional model  
 
β0j = γ00 + u0j                                   (4) 
 
 Maximum Likelihood method of estimate will be used in this study because the 
number of firms vary considerably among countries (Max. number of firms is 203 in UK 
and Min. number of firms is 18 in Malaysia). Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) argue that 
when n is unbalanced between groups, iterative numerical procedures, Maximum 
Likelihood, must be used to obtain efficient estimates. The estimation of variance 
component of level 1 and level 2 are used to calculate the intra class correlation (ICC) 
which measures the proportion of the variance in the outcome (density) that is between 
the level 2 units (countries) (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). In other words, the ICC 
represents a ratio of the between country variance in network density to the total variance 
in network density.      
                                   




 Where τ00 is the level 2 residual variance and σ2 is the level 1 residual variance.      
I use the HLM software version 7 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2010) to calculate the 
parameters of the unconditional model. The results show that σ2 = 0.06352 (variance of 
firms' density scores within countries assuming homogeneity across countries).  τ00 = 
0.00831 (the variability of density among countries). By using equation (5), the ICC will 
be:  
 ICC = .00831/ (.00831 + .06352) = .11569 
 That means 11.6% of the variation in network density resides between countries 
and 88.4% resides within countries. Since in most social science research ICC ranges 
between 0 and .4 (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), any ICC above .1 is deemed acceptable 
(Bliese, 2000). The reliability estimate is .803, which is fairly high. The fixed effect 
estimated in this model is the intercept (the average density value across countries) the 
γ00 = .13 with a standard error of .02. This coefficient differs significantly from zero (t 
(17) = 5.69,  p < .001). The results also indicate a statistically significant amount of 
variability in network density score between countries (σ2 (17) = 85.73, p < .001). Since 
a reasonable amount of variability was found both within and among countries, level 2 
predictors can be added to the unconditional model (Beretvas, 2007). 
 Since we have only 18 countries on level 2 and taking into consideration the test 
power, we are restricted for the number of variables that we can include into the model in 
each run. The rule of thumb is that each variable needs at least 10 units on level 2 to 
maintain acceptable power (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). I will test the 
relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable separately. I 






	 Since the hypotheses of the study concerned only level 2 (country) effect, and 
following Parboteeah et al. (2008), I just report level two correlations. The correlation 
matrix is presented in table (11) and it clearly shows that there is no problem of 
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The high and significant correlation between the normative pillar and the 
regulative pillar is very interesting because the sign is negative. The negative correlation 
indicates that countries with weak regulative systems will tend to have more norms of 
inter organizational relationships, which support the main theme of the study. The 
correlation between the regulative and cognitive pillars is low and not significant which 
indicates that at least in the selected countries there is no significant relationship between 
countries’ regulative systems and their cognitive knowledge of cooperation between 
firms. 
The high and significant correlations between the regulative pillar and the 
availability of knowledge and technological resources are consistent with the predictions 
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of this study. The sign is positive which means that countries with strong regulative 
environment will tend to have more availability of knowledge and technological 
resources.  
It can be noticed that there is a high and significant correlation between the 
normative pillar and availability of technology. This high correlation does not post any 
challenge of high collinearity because the two variables are not included together in any 
model in the study. The negative sign between the two variables is also consistent with 
the general theme of the study because it indicates that the norms of collaboration will 
prevail in countries that have less availability of technological resources.  
The high and significant correlation between the availability of technology and 
availability of knowledge was expected. The positive sign emphasizes that the more 
available the knowledge in a country, the more available the latest technologies which is 
aligned with the main theme of this study. It is worth mentioning here that technologies 
as measured in this research represent industrial technologies rather than consumer 
technologies. This differentiation is necessary because many oil rich countries might have 
high availability of latest consumer technologies without having the availability of 
industrial technologies.   
An interesting finding from this correlation matrix that worth further investigation 
is the low and not significant correlation between the availability of financial resources 
and the availability of both knowledge and technological resources. These findings go 
against the common perceptions that countries with more available financial resources 
should enjoy more availability of knowledge and technology. By investigating countries’ 
scores on the availability of financial resources, we can notice that there are many 
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advanced countries that have high availability of technology and knowledge and at the 
same time have a below average availability of financial resources. These countries are 
Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, and Sweden. Therefore, it is too simplistic to 




We use equation (2) to test for the hypotheses 1 to 6. Hypothesis (1) speculates 
that countries with stronger regulative systems will tend to have less network density 
because there is less need for networks to arrange the economic activities of firms. Model 
(1) tests this hypothesis and as it appears on Table 12, the relationship between the 
regulative pillar and the density of network is negative and significant, which indicates 
that the higher the score of a country on a regulative pillar the lower the density of the 
biomedical network in that country. The standard error is also very low (.002). These 
results support hypothesis (1).  
Hypothesis (2) claims that the higher the score on the normative pillar, the more 
the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The results from model (2) 
show that the coefficient is significant and positive which support hypothesis (2)
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density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. The result in model (3) is 
positive which supports a positive relationship; however, it is not significant which does 
not yield a sufficient support for hypothesis (3). 
Hypothesis (4) claims that the more available knowledge resources within a 
country, the lower the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. Model 
(4) tests this hypothesis and the result is negative and significant which strongly supports 
hypothesis (4). Hypothesis (5) states that the more available the technological resources 
in a country, the lower the density of the network structure of its biomedical industry. 
The results of Model (5) indicate a significant and negative relationship between network 
density and availability of knowledge resources. Hypothesis (6) indicates that the more 
available the financial capital in a country, the lower the density of the network structure 
of its biomedical industry. Model (6) supports this hypothesis because the relationship is 
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Hypothesis 7 claims that the effect of the regulative pillar on the network 
structures of the biomedical industry will be partially mediated by the availability of 
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strategic resources in that country. To test if a variable (M) mediates the relationship 
between the independent variable (I) and the dependent variable (D), Baron and Kenny 
(1986), propose a three step procedure: i) first is testing the direct relationship between 
the independent and the dependent variable, ii) second is testing for the relationship 
between the independent variable and the mediator, and iii) third is regressing the 
dependent variable on the independent and mediator variables. If all the relationships are 
significant, this means that there is a partial mediation. If the significance of the 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variables disappear, that means 
we have a full mediation.  
Testing multilevel mediation models by using HLM has received much support in 
the literature (Zhang, Zyphur & Preacher, 2009). Some scholars refer to this type of 
relationship as the meso mediational relationships (Mathieu & Taylor, 2007). Since the 
model of this research is 2 2 1 (the antecedent and mediation variables are at level 2 and 
the outcome variable is at level 1), the three steps of Baron and Kenny (1986) can be 
used to test for mediation by using HLM to test for independent dependent and 
independent mediator dependent relationships while regression analysis can be used to 
test for the independent mediator relationship (Zhang et al., 2009).   
The first stage of the mediating test is already executed in model (1) when we 
show a significant relationship between the regulative pillar and the network density. In 
stage (2) the relationships between the independent variable and the mediators are tested. 
Models 7, 8, and 9 test the relationships between the regulative pillar and the availability 
of resources (summarized in table 14). Since the two independent variables and the 
mediators are at the same level of analysis, regression models have been used to test for 
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the relationships. The results of these regression models presented in table (8) indicate 
that all coefficients are positive and significant which support the notion that the higher 
the score on the regulative pillar in a country, the more available the financial, 




	 "%	:	 "%	;	 "%	<	
-(	  3.35** 12.54**  4.761*** 
-0% 1	
$-	
.068***   
%" 	
$-	
 .178**  
3-%	
$-	
  .48** 
p* < .1 p** <.05 p*** <.01 
 
Finally, we need to perform the last stage of the mediating test. We use HLM 
because these tests span two levels of analyses (i.e. country and firm levels). Equations (6 
and 7) will be used to test the last stage of the mediating effect. Since the dependent 
variable is the same (i.e. the network density) the level 1 equation will be similar to 
equation (1). The level 2 equation will be    
   
    β0j = γ00 + γ01 * (REGULATIj) + γ02 * (Zj) + u0j                                                                  (6) 
 
 
The mixed model will be  
 
 
DENSITYij = γ00 + γ01 * (REGULATIj) + γ02 * (Zj) + u0j + rij                                              (7) 
 
 
Where Zj   is the availability of resource variables (financial, knowledge and 
technological), γ00 is the second stage intercept term, γ01 is the slope relating regulative 
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pillar to the intercept term from the level 1 equation, γ02 is the slope relating the 
availability of resource variables to the intercept from the level 1 equation, u0j is the 
level 2 residual, and rij is the error term.   
Models (10 12) test the mediating effect by utilizing equation (7). Table (15) 
summarizes the results of the three models. From model (10), we can see the significance 
has disappeared from the regulative pillar; however, the coefficient of the financial 
resources is still significant which yields support for the full mediation effect. Similarly, 
the results of model (11) show that the significance has disappeared from the regulative 
pillar while the coefficient of the knowledge resources stayed significant. This result 
provides more evidence for the full mediation effect. Finally, model (12) provides a 
strong support for the full mediation effect of the resource availability because, again, the 
regulative pillar is not significant while the coefficient of the technological resources is 
significant.  
Hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c are considered as partially supported because the 
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resources was partial mediation, while the findings of the study supported the full 
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mediation relationship. This deviation from the partial to full mediation is not very 
significant; therefore, we indicated that these hypotheses are partially supported (not 
rejected or fully supported)  
It can be concluded from the theoretical discussion in chapters (2) that the 
availability of resources has a stronger influence on network structure than just affecting 
the relationship between the institutional profile and network density; therefore, the 
mediating argument is adopted in this study instead of the moderating argument. To test 
for a possible moderating effect, two way interactions between the regulative pillar and 
the three resource variables are performed using equation (8).   
 
DENSITYij = γ00 + γ01 * (REGULATIj) + γ02 * (REGULATIj * Zj) + u0j + rij               (8) 
 
Where Zj   is the availability of resource variables (financial, knowledge and 
technological), γ00 is the second stage intercept term, γ01 is the slope relating regulative 
pillar to the intercept term from the level 1 equation, γ02 is the slope relating the two way 
interactions between the availability of resource and the regulative pillar to the intercept 
from the level 1 equation, u0j is the level 2 residual, and rij is the error term.   
The results for testing the moderating effect is provided in table (16).  Model (13) 
tests the moderating effect of the availability of knowledge resources on the relationship 
between the regulative pillar and network density. The results are not significant which 
means that we are not able to detect any moderating affect for the knowledge resource 
availability. Models (14 & 15) that test for the moderating effect of the availability of 
technology and financial resources respectively, show the same non significant results, 
which also indicates that the moderation argument of resource availability does not 
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explain the relationship between the three constructs (regulative pillar, availability of 
resources, and network density). As a result, the mediation argument is adopted in this 
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A summary for the results of the hypotheses testing is provided in figure (11), and 























































































/	The more available the technological resources 
the less the density 
Supported 

5	The more available the knowledge resources the 
less the density 
Supported 

9	The more available the financial resources the 
less the density 
Supported 

:	Availability of technological capital partially 
mediates the relationship between the regulative 
pillar and the network density  
Partially Supported 

:2	Availability of knowledge capital partially 
mediates the relationship between the regulative 
pillar and the network density 
Partially Supported 

:-	Availability of financial capital partially 
mediates the relationship between the regulative 























The major aim of this research is to detect if there is a country effect on network 
structure, and explain the main factors behind this country effect. The results of the HLM 
show that there is a variation in network density among the 18 countries included in this 
study. The result of the interclass correlation indicates that there is a difference between 
countries though it is not that high. The ICC is (0.115) which implies that 11.5% of the 
density variation is among countries and 88.5% is within countries. 
This result yields a good support for the argument that “countries do matter” in 
regard to network structures. Even though the biomedical industry is a relatively new 
global industry, this study shows that even in an industry which is mainly driven by 
global norms there is a considerable role for local norms in shaping firms’ strategies and 
more specifically their networking strategies.   
This research emphasizes that the density variation among countries is explained 
by local institutional and resource availability factors. More specifically, the regulative, 
normative, and cognitive institutions in addition to availability of three types of resources 
(knowledge, technology, and financial) can shape the networking strategies of firms.  
As discussed in the introduction, connecting the institutional environment to the 
networking activities of firms (e.g. Dacin et al., 2007; Peng & Zhou, 2005) is not 
something new in the literature; however, very few studies have tried to empirically test 
the magnitude of the institutional effects on network structure. This research bridges this 
gap by providing an empirical demonstration of the institutional effects on network 
structure.   
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The results of the HLM indicate that there is a significant correlation between the 
regulative and normative pillars of a country and the density of its network. More 
specifically, it has been shown that a weak and less reliable regulative system in a 
country encourages firms to have more network density to compensate for the weak 
regulative system. The norms of collaboration either on the individual or organizational 
levels also encourage firms to have denser networks. The coefficients for the effects of 
regulative and normative institutional pillars are significant but low (table, 13) which 
indicates that the institutional effect is relatively low.  
This is while no significant effect was found for the cognitive pillar on network 
structure. Failing to show a correlation between the cognitive pillar and the network 
structure can be explained either theoretically or empirically. From a theoretical point of 
view, we can argue that the view of personal trust and friendship have little effect on a 
firm’s tendency to make alliances in the biomedical industry because the reliance is on 
formal relationships rather than personal trust in this industry.  
From an empirical point of view, the result of no relationship can also be 
explained by arguing that the exact measures used to construct the cognitive pillar have 
no relationship, but if we try to change the component of the cognitive pillar, we might 
find a relationship with the network structure. For instance, strong attempts had been 
undertaken to include the number of business associations as a part of the cognitive pillar. 
However there is no database that provides the number of business associations in the 18 
countries included in this study. I have tried to directly contact the specialized authority 
in many of the 18 countries (including China and India), but I have received no reliable 
answers about the number of associations in these countries. Therefore, the item on 
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"number of business associations” was not included as one of the components that 
construct the cognitive pillar.   
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 connect the availability of resources to the density of 
networks. All of these hypotheses have received support from the HLM test. All the 
relationships were significant and their signs were negative. This implies that countries 
with less availability of knowledge, technological, and financial resources will have 
denser networks. The high density of networks will secure the flow of resources among 
the network members while there is less need for dense networks to transfer resources if 
those resources are already available from other sources.       
The results of these hypotheses provide a good empirical support to the resource 
dependence theory’s predictions regarding networking activities of firms. One of the 
dominant lines of enquiry in resource dependence literature is how dependence affects 
organizational decisions (Pfeffer, 2005). The argument is that the more availability of 
resources in a country, the less dependent are firms on each other. The low dependence 
encourages firms to establish fewer alliances, which consequently reduces the density of 
alliance networks.   
The results of this research regarding the relationship between resource 
availability and network structure reinforce similar findings in the literature. For instance, 
Hite and Hesterly (2001) indicate that dense networks offer advantages for emerging 
firms in gaining access to needed resources. Other studies found that firms under 
conditions of high resource interdependence tend to establish small dense networks in 
which most partners connect to the other networks members (Baum et al., 2003; Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999). Uzzi (1999) argues that firms that are embedded in networks 
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characterized by a mix of dense and arm’s length ties receive better interest rate on loans. 
The general theme in relationship between networks and resource procurements is 
that network density is a viable factor in acquiring needed resources. However, all of 
these studies are firm level which connect the structure of a firm’s network to its ability 
to acquire resources. Establishing the relationship between the availability of resources at 
the country level to the ego density at the firm level is a major contribution of this 
research because this relationship demonstrates the strategic nature of networks (Gulati, 
1999; Hite & Hesterly, 2001).     
Hypothesis 7 (a c) proposes that the availability of resources partially mediates 
the relationship between the regulative pillar and the network density. The three steps to 
test mediation indicate that the relationship is a full mediation and not a partial mediation. 
This result implies that the institutional environment affects network structure through its 
influence on the availability of resources.   
The full mediation can be justified in lieu of partial mediation because the 
regulative pillar as measured by the freedom index might have little direct effect on the 
density of a country’s network. It can also be argued that the influence through the 
affecting mediator variables is much stronger than the direct effect.  
Combining the institutional and resource considerations in one framework helps 
to reconcile the argument of conformity of the institutional theory and the strategic 
choice of the resource dependence theory (Oliver, 1991). The result of the study indicates 
that the institutional environment shapes the distribution of resources in a way that makes 
networking a more rational strategic option than other strategic options, such as merger 
and acquisition. The reconciliation of the economic and institutional factors in 
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determining the strategy of firms is a major contribution in this study.  
This research provides many practical implications for managers especially for 
those who are interested in entering new international markets. For instance, recognizing 
the difference between countries in regards to the structure of networks can have 
significant implications for managing international operations. For instance, if a 
pharmaceutical firm wants to enter a foreign country, it is really important to know the 
local structure of relationships so the new entrant can position itself in the existing 
structure in the most appropriate way to achieve its objectives.  
Moreover, by recognizing the institutional and resource factors, managers of firms 
can expect what to find in a foreign country in regard to the local web of relationships 
among firms by just identifying the regulative and normative pillars in addition to the 
availability of the three types of resources. For instance, a manager can expect to find a 
low density of networks in a host country if that country has strong regulative system and 
high availability of the three specified resources.  
Organizations, in general, need the support of their environment to survive 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Foreign subsidiaries must adapt to different institutional 
pressures that organize the markets in which they operate (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994) 
and reduce the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1999). The external legitimacy of a 
foreign subsidiary is its acceptance and approval by the host country institutions 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). It is awarded by the institutional 
environment in which the subsidiary is embedded and is manifested by adopting practices 
institutionalized in that environment (Tempel, Edwards, Ferner, Muller Camen, & 
Wächter, 2006). Identifying the local norms is the first step for conforming to those 
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norms. This research provides an overview for the norms of networking in 18 countries, 
which have very strong implications for practitioners. 
Figure (12) presents the average score of firms on the ego network measures in 
the selected 18 countries that can be classified into three groups. We can notice that in 
red labeled countries, the average density of firms is relatively high (above .1). On the 
other hands, the ego density is low in the green labeled countries (below .05). Finally, 
firms in the blue labeled countries have, on average, moderate ego network densities (.05 
  .1). The average network density can give an overview for the norms of networking in a 
country. For instance, it is clear form figure (11) that biomedical firms in Italy have on 
average high ego densities, which means the norms for firms in Italy, is to have high 
density. Any new entrants to the Italian market should try to build high density network if 
it wants to conform to the local norms of networking.    
 





One of the problems of the study is that it concentrates on formal networks and 
overlooks informal networks. Informal networks are indeed prevalent in developing 
countries. However, I do not think that overlooking the informal networks posts a big 
problem to the validity of the results of this study because informal networks have very 
limited role in the biomedical industry as a highly regulated industry. Many national 
regulatory authorities oversee and monitor medical research such as the development of 
new drugs. More specifically, in the USA the Food and Drug Administration oversees 
new drug development, while in Europe, there is the European Medicines Agency, and 
in Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The World Medical 
Association develops the ethical standards for the medical profession, involved in 
medical research. The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) works on the 
creation of rules and guidelines for the development of new medication, such as the 
guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP).  
One factor that encourages the formalization of the relationships between 
biomedical firms is the need to protect the property rights that are produced as a result of 
joint efforts. Stuart et al. (1999) indicate that biotech firms often have patents to protect 
their technological knowledge, which can be considered as a crucial resource for these 
technology intensive firms.  
Formalizing and declaring the relationships between biomedical firms and 
pharmaceutical firms also helps biomedical companies to signal competencies. For a 
biomedical firm, the alliance with a legitimate pharmaceutical firm offers proof of its 
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ability to create potential revenue generating inventions and signals the depth of its 
technological capabilities to external constituents in the marketplace (Stuart et al., 1999), 
which increases the value of the biomedical firm (Janney & Folta, 2003). 
The highly regulated environment, the necessity of the property right protection, 
in addition to the benefit of partnership declaration all reduce the existence of informal 
networks in the biomedical industry. Therefore, we can safely rely on formal networks to 
detect the actual web of relationships in the biomedical industry.    
Another limitation of the study is the reliance on secondary data to measure the 
countries’ institutional profile. The majority of initial studies about institutional profile 
relied on primary sources of data to measure different pillars of the institutional profile 
(e.g. Busenitz et al., 2000; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Using secondary data to construct the 
measures of the independent and mediator variables reduces the reliability of these 
measures because they are collected from different sources. Since it is really difficult to 
collect primary data for each domain of countries’ institutional profile, I opted to use 
secondary data just like many other researchers in this literature (e.g. Ang & Michailova, 
2008; Parboteeah et al., 2008; Parboteeah et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2004).   
In order to control for the industry effect, the comparison between countries has 
been conducted for just the biomedical industry. That might pose some challenges for 
generalizability of the results. However, we believe that if we were able to deduct a 
difference in structure among countries in such a globally integrated industry, we can 
expect to find more variation in traditional industries because they have been operating in 
their home countries for a long time, which increases their exposure to local norms.  
Finally, the nature of the biomedical industry requires many advanced 
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technologies and other resources which can restrict our sample for just advanced or 
emerging countries. For instance, we were not able to construct a biomedical network for 
any African, South American, Eastern European, or Middle Eastern country. 
Consequently, the final sample included countries that have many institutional 
similarities especially regarding regulative pillar and availability of resources. This 
problem can be mitigated by comparing the networks of industries that have more diverse 
international coverage such as textile and retailing. We can also argue that if we were 
able to find institutional effects for such similar countries, we expect to find stronger 
results if we can include more institutionally diverse countries.   
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Future research can look at other structural variables that might be affected by 
institutional factors. For instance, it is worthwhile to detect the relationship between 
centrality and the institutional profile of the country. The regulative system in a country 
might encourage the establishments of very big firms that occupy central positions in 
their networks. Normative and cognitive pillars might also show an effect on firms’ 
centrality in their networks. For instance, it is reasonable to expect the existence of a 
relationship between the network centrality and cultural variable of power distance. 
This study concentrates on the structural embeddedness of firms (the density of 
the structure). Future research can investigate the relationship between the relational 
embeddedness and the institutional environment. The relational embeddedness 
concentrates on the strength of ties among firms (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Networks 
consist of strong and weak ties (Rowley et al., 2000). It is highly expected to see a cross 
country variation in terms of the strength of ties among firms. That variation can be 
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explained by regulative as well as cognitive and normative factors.   
Very interesting implications for the difference in network structure that has been 
established in this study can be comparing the different performance outcomes of the 
different structures. For instance, it is worth investigating whether density or structural 
holes have different performance implications in different countries. This argument will 
add to our understanding of the debate between Burt (1992) and Coleman (1988) about 
the superiority of closure or holes.  
This research explains the establishment of alliance networks by institutional and 
resource dependence factors; however, there are other factors that might affect firms’ 
propensities to participate in alliances such as market seeking objectives. Powell (1990) 
argues that alliances are very effective mechanisms to have access to new markets. 
Consequently, it would be interesting to see if there is any relationship between the size 
of the market in a country and the structure of ego networks in that country.  
Related to the size of a market is the level of competition in that market. Gimeno 
(2004) indicates that firms participate in alliances as a strategic response to their 
competitors’ establishments of alliances. Using a longitudinal alliances’ data along with 
the competitive rivalry theory might allow us to see how the network structure will 
change as a results to the competitive actions and reactions.  
Finally, this research connects the social capital that is available in a society to the 
density of organizational networks. It will be more accurate if we can measure the social 
capital of the individuals who are closely related to the economic activities of firms such 
as top management team, board of directors, managers, and employees. It has been 
established in the literature that the social capitals of the top management team 
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(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), board of directors (Gulati & Westphal, 1999), and 
middle managers (Rosenkop et al., 2001) have significant influences on firms’ 
propensities to establish alliances and networks. Therefore, it is worth investigating to see 
if there is any relationship between the density of the board interlock network in a 
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A news search by the native language was performed to detect alliance news that is not 
reported in English speaking outlets. This process was performed for firms in these three 
countries: China, South Korea, and Malaysia. The main source of the news is the Factiva 
database. The procedures were as following: 
1)
 Prepare the list of firms in each of these four countries.  
2)
 Insert the names of each firms in the Factiva’s search field (the name should be 
inserted in the native language because inserting the English name will most 
probably brings news that are reported in English outlets).   
3)
 The resulted news in the native language then translated by Google Translate into 
English (a built in feature at the Factiva website).  
4)
 Searching for alliance news in the resulted English text.  
This process did not significantly increase the number of alliances in these countries. For 
instance, the increase was just 3 alliances to the 156 already reported alliances in China. 
No alliances were added to the Korean firms, and one alliance was added to a Malaysian 
Firm.  
4!(%						
To detect the news in Chinese about the Beijing Sinovac Biotech Co. Ltd., the names first 
translated from English to Chinese: 北北北 北北北北北北北北兴 . Then the search for this firm 
at Factiva resulted in 148 piece of news. One piece of news, reported below, indicates on 
paragraph (5) that the Beijing Sinovac Biotech has a joint development agreement with 
another Chinese organization which is the Chinese Center of Disease Control to develop 
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a bird flu vaccine. This alliance is not reported in the SDC and RECAP databases, and I 
added it to the alliances performed by these two firms. The total of 3 alliances was added 
















(Network structure)  
  
Network density  The number of ties divided by the 
number of pairs, times 100 





Regulative Pillar   Index of economic freedom: Business 
Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal 
Freedom, Government Spending, 
Monetary Freedom, Investment 
Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property 
rights, Freedom from Corruption, 
and Labor freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
and Wall Street 
Journal 
 Normative  
Pillar  





The total number of alliances in 
a country for the total number 






How would you characterize corporate 
activity in your country? (1 = 
dominated by a few business groups; 7 




1  whether children take pride in the 
individual accomplishments of their 
parents and vice versa 
2  whether aging parents live at home 
with their children 
3  whether children live at home with 




Trust Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people? 
Possible answers 
1 Most people can be trusted 
2 Can´t be too careful 
 1 Don´t know 
 2 No answer 
 3 Not applicable 
 4 Not asked in survey 
 5 Missing; Unknown 
WVS 




Do you think most people try to take 
advantage of you (10 point scale) 
Possible answers  

 1 Would take advantage 

 2 2 

 3 3 






 5 5 

 6 6 

 7 7 

 8 8 

 9 9 

 10 Try to be fair 

  1 Don´t know 

  2 No answer 

  3 Not applicable 

  4 Not asked in survey 

  5 Missing; Unknown 
Important in 
life: friends 
For each of the following aspects, 
indicate how important it is in your 
life. Would you say it is: Friends 
Possible answers  
1 Very important 
2 Rather important 
3 Not very important 
4 Not at all important 
 1 Don´t know 
 2 No answer 
 3 Not applicable 
 4 Not asked in survey 
 5 Missing; Unknown 
WVS 









The educational system in your 
country (1 = does not meet the needs 
of a competitive economy, 7 = meets 









Scientific and technical journal articles 
refer to the number of scientific and 
engineering articles published in the 
following fields: physics, biology, 
chemistry, mathematics, clinical 
medicine, biomedical research, 
engineering and technology, and earth 









In your country, the latest technologies 
are (1 = not widely available or used, 





Companies in your country are (1 = 
not able to absorb new technology, 7 = 






In your country, production processes 
use (1 = labour intensive methods or 
previous generations of process 
technology, 7 = the world’s best and 









Domestic credit provided by the 
banking sector includes all credit to 
various sectors on a gross basis, with 






sector government, which is net. The 
banking sector includes monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks, 
as well as other banking institutions 
where data are available (including 
institutions that do not accept 
transferable deposits but do incur such 





(Outstanding loan)* 100/GDP 
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